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George: Not Everybody Loves Raymond

ARTICLE
NOT EVERYBODY LOVES RAYMOND:1
HOW THE CASE OF RAYMOND V. RAYMOND2
MADE A SHAMBLES OF INTERSPOUSAL
GIFT PRESUMPTIONS AND THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN MATTERS
OF TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
PAMELA E. GEORGE*

1. With apologies to Everybody Loves Raymond, a situation comedy, starring Ray Romano, that ran
on American television (CBS) from 1996–2005. Everybody Loves Raymond, IMDB, https://www.imdb.
com/title/tt0115167/ [https://perma.cc/C78R-SRLN]. As evidence of the “love” for Raymond, the
show has been syndicated and is shown in the United States and several foreign countries and has even
spawned a Russian spinoff. Nick Holdsworth & Vladimir Kozlov, ‘Everybody Loves Raymond’ Remake
Becomes Longest-Running Russian Version of a U.S. Show, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 2, 2016, 3:54 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/everybody-loves-raymond-russian-adaptation-925862
[https://perma.cc/P6EX-TPTN]. The television show has absolutely nothing to do with the subject
of this article.
2. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). This
case has absolutely everything to do with the subject of this article, in that the Raymond opinion gives
rise to this article.
*
Pamela E. George, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, has taught Texas
Family Law and Texas Marital Property Rights for more than thirty-five years. Professor George is
Board Certified in Family Law and also Board Certified in Civil Appellate Law by the Texas Board of
Legal Specialization. A case that she was recently involved in, Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.), gave rise to her interest in the Raymond case.
Professor George, lead appellate counsel for James Stearns, was successful in the Stearns case in
escaping application of Raymond. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals sitting in Houston specifically
declined to follow Raymond in Stearns v. Martens, choosing to “agree with the body of cases in which
courts of appeals hold that, if the instrument contains no separate-property recitals, then parol evidence
is admissible . . . .” Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548 (first citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV,
2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr,
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980 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness,
241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d
77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). It was from this practical experience that
Professor George realized the havoc that could be wreaked should the analysis in Raymond be applied
with regularity by Texas courts. Special thanks is offered to Sarah Presas, John Flud, and James Harris,
who, as students at South Texas College of Law Houston (now recent graduates) and members of the
Law Review, aided in cite checking, quote checking, and in the expansion of certain footnotes.
Mr. Flud also contributed to the analysis of the Raymond opinion. Without the generous and brilliant
help of these three, the publication of this article would have been much more difficult.
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I. INTRODUCTION & SCOPE
In 2005, a unanimous panel of the First Court of Appeals sitting in
Houston issued the opinion in Raymond v. Raymond, an opinion that denied
a divorcing spouse the right to establish separate property by use of parol
evidence.3 Surprisingly, Raymond has more often been noticed for its general
language regarding standards of review4 and its holding regarding affidavits
accompanying new evidence motions for new trial,5 rather than its departure
from well-established and long-existing precedent of marital property
characterization regarding interspousal gift presumptions, significant
recitals, and the parol evidence rule.6
3. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81.
4. Raymond has been cited numerous times and utilized in briefs for the well-established legal
tenet that an appellate court reviews a “trial court’s characterization of property under an abuse of
discretion standard.” Id. at 80 (citing Robles v. Robles, 965 S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)); see also Rosensky v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164
at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We review the trial court’s
characterization of property in a divorce under an abuse of discretion standard.” (citing Raymond,
190 S.W.3d at 80; Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied)));
Appellee’s Brief at 3, In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)
(No. 06–12–0054–CV), 2012 WL 6813549, at *3 (determining abuse of discretion as the standard of
review for property characterization in a divorce); Appellee’s Brief at 11, Jones v. Houston Structural
Inc., No. 01–05–00834–CV, 2006 WL 2291010 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 10, 2006, no
pet.), 2006 WL 583954, at *11 (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or
arbitrary manner, or when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles.”).
5. The wife in Raymond attempted to introduce evidence at the hearing on her “new evidence”
motion for new trial. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 82. The trial court barred her from introducing her new
evidence because she had not verified her motion for new trial. Id. The First Court of Appeals held,
“When a party seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the motion for new trial must
verify that the evidence is true and correct.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying introduction of the testimony offered as new evidence, nor did it err in summarily overruling
the portions of wife’s motion for new trial that were based on new evidence. Id.
6. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910–12 (Tex. 1968) (declining to overrule a line of
cases preventing extrinsic evidence from being admitted to prove property being held in trust instead
of being separate property); Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. 1952) (“Since the deed
states the nature of the estate conferred upon the wife and the consideration being contractual, parol
evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the deed in the absence of allegations of fraud, accident
or mistake.” (citing Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 S.W. 870, 872 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1921); Russell v.
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While the Raymond case is, to this author’s mind, a dangerous anomaly,
Houston’s First Court of Appeals did not reach their conclusion without
precedent and careful analysis, distinguishing (or, more precisely, attempting
to distinguish) the Raymond facts from contrary, well-established holdings. In
a nutshell, the Raymond case concerns husband’s transfer to wife of an
undivided one-half interest in his separate property, husband having owned
the property prior to marriage.7 The Raymond trial court found that the
transferred property remained husband’s separate property.8 The appellate
court reversed, deciding the property should be characterized as wife’s
separate property as a matter of law9 and determining that parol evidence
could not be introduced to establish the character of the property as
husband’s separate property.10 The basis for the appellate court’s decision is
neither clearly enunciated, nor easily understood.
On the one hand, it may be the mode of transfer11 (i.e., between spouses)
upon which the Raymond court depends to explain its approach, treating
the gift presumption that arises, if any,12 as rebuttable by parol evidence only
if there is accident, fraud, or mistake.13 This will be referred to as the
interspousal transfer theory, as opposed to a transfer from or involving a
third party. The Raymond court does espouse the theory that rebuttal of
Russell, 120 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1934); Kidd v. Young, 190 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.
1945); Nye v. Bradford, 193 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1946); Markum v. Markum, 210 S.W. 835, 840–41
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1919, writ dism’d))); McKivett v. McKivett 70 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1934)
(stating parol evidence could not be permitted to contradict the conveyance of separate property);
Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, holding approved) (recognizing
the allowance of parol evidence to show payment of property with separate funds); see also In re Marriage
of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 715 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (noting the trial court allowed
a party to enter extrinsic evidence about ownership of separate property).
7. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (providing, in pertinent part, “All property, both real and
personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or
descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse”); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001
(establishing separate property of a spouse “consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed by the
spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or
descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any
recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage”).
8. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79.
9. Id. at 81.
10. Id.
11. Meaning the separate property transfer between spouses, or an interspousal conveyance, as
distinguished from a conveyance to a spouse by a third party. Id.
12. The Raymond court is unclear whether the opinion hinges upon a gift presumption. See
generally id. (distinguishing the Raymond case from previous decisions where there was a rebuttable
presumption of a gift between spouses).
13. Id.
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the interspousal gift presumption by parol evidence is limited to those
situations in which husband purchases property from a third party and at
time of purchase, and without a significant recital, has the property conveyed
wholly or partially to wife.14
Or, on the other hand the Raymond court may have considered the
conveyancing language found in the Raymond deed15 to somehow be an
express or significant recital, utilizing the significant recital theory.16 This
being said, the Raymond court appears to have paid scant attention to the
fact that there was an absence of language17 actually establishing the
character of the property conveyed within the conveyancing documents.
Such an absence of language would, under more prevalent, persuasive, and
authoritative precedent, open the door for rebuttal of the gift by parol
evidence.18 The problem is, neither the interspousal transfer theory, nor the
significant recital theory as espoused by the Raymond court are anchored in
classically accepted legal analysis of interspousal gift transactions.
Although not an entirely renegade opinion, the Raymond analysis is so
precariously founded as to be contrary to well-set Texas Supreme Court
precedent.19 Indeed, the First Court’s sister court, Houston’s Fourteenth

14. See id. (recognizing a line of cases where “a rebuttable presumption [was] raised that the
spouse intended to give the other spouse an undivided one-half interest in the property as a gift” (citing
Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ))).
15. “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an undivided one-half interest in the Lake
Jackson property.” Id. at 79.
16. See id. at 81 (“When there has been a conveyance of property by one spouse to another . . .
the presumption exists that it was the intention of the grantor spouse to make the property the separate
property of the grantee spouse and in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance
cannot be disturbed.” (citing Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication))).
17. Such language establishing the character of property is referred to in common parlance as a
significant recital or an express recital, which clearly establishes the character as separate, not merely an
undivided one-half interest that could arguably be community or separate. See Bahr v. Kohr,
980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (emphasizing the language used in
express deeds that expressly convey property as separate property).
18. See Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. App.—Austin 1980, no writ)
(recognizing a rebuttable presumption of a gift when a spouse purchases property with separate funds
and adds the other spouse on the deed); Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 309 (affirming the trial court’s ruling
because “[t]he evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of a gift”).
19. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910–12 (Tex. 1968) (following precedent that
extrinsic evidence not be admissible when a deed expressly states the property is conveyed as separate
property); see also Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (discussing, at length, what constitutes
significant recital).
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Court of Appeals, recently declined to follow Raymond in Stearns v. Martens.20
By way of this author’s thinking, the Raymond opinion, though well
written, is erroneous, being an extension of a scant, few, earlier opinions that
also erred in failing to recognize the subtle, but clear, nuances of
interspousal gifts that are accompanied by writings, be they deeds21 or other
documents.22 The Raymond case and its ilk have led bench and bar alike to
improperly argue and even deny spouses the right to utilize parol evidence
to establish the characterization of property conveyed between spouses
during marriage.23
This article will begin with an in depth analysis of the Raymond opinion
in an attempt to diagram and dissect the appellate court’s reasoning in
reversing the trial court and in disallowing (i.e., ignoring) husband’s evidence
explaining why he placed his wife’s name on the deed to property that he
owned before marriage—clearly his separate property.24 This first step will
include an analysis of the cases which provided the path for the Raymond
divergence and just how that divergence came to exist and proliferate.
The analysis of Raymond and its precursors will be followed by an
explanation of purchase money resulting trusts25 and the parol evidence
rule.26 This is important because the principles of purchase money resulting
trusts, together with the parol evidence rule, provide the foundation for the
well-established law governing interspousal gifts and the presumptions
arising therefrom; principles skirted, if not ignored by the Raymond strain
of cases. Once these basic trust and evidentiary principles are understood,
20. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
21. Generally, at issue is real estate deeds. See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 912 (containing a significant
recital in the deed); Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 890 (allowing husband to testify when wife’s “name was
subsequently added to the deed and the sale was consummated”); Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 309
(containing no significant recital in the deed).
22. In the more recent case of Stearns v. Martens, the property at issue was the stock in a closely
held community corporation that was allegedly gifted to wife; the documents proffered included a letter
and a bill of sale. Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548–50.
23. See, for example, the position taken by wife and accepted by the trial court, but reversed on
appeal in Stearns v. Martens. Id. at 548.
24. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (stating property owned before marriage is the separate
property of the spouse with ownership); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (codifying the rules for
separate property in Texas).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
26. Parol evidence is a contract principle. “The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence,
but a rule of substantive contract law.” Jarvis v. K & E Re One, LLC, 390 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1958);
Edascio, L.L.C. v. NextiraOne L.L.C., 264 S.W.3d 786, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet.
denied)).
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it becomes clear how the long recognized interspousal gift presumptions
arose. These same principles underlie the established boundaries for
admitting evidence to rebut the interspousal gift presumption when those
transactions are accompanied by documents of conveyance.
Accordingly, the third portion of this article will explore those
instances when a gift presumption can overcome the ever prevalent
community property presumption;27 i.e., when property is acquired by one
spouse using their separate property and that property is then placed—in
whole or in part—in the name of the non-paying spouse.28 In such
situations, the taking of title in the name of or title sharing with the nonpaying spouse, without a significant recital, creates a presumption of gift,
rebuttable by parol evidence, a rule contrary to Raymond.29 The general rules
regarding the use of parol evidence in establishing the character of those
properties will be set forth. The rebuttable nature of such conveyances
will be explained and evidence that has been utilized in attempts to rebut
this presumption will be explored, be such utilization successful or not.
Following exploration of the gift presumption and the use of parol
evidence, the fourth part of this article will identify and explore specific
words of conveyance and their effect upon the use of parol evidence. If
certain words are utilized in a conveyance, the words could be deemed
a significant or express recital. A significant recital in a deed is one that clearly
establishes “the intent to make the property conveyed the separate property
of the wife . . . .”30 Proper significant recitals limit the use of parol
evidence.31 The Texas Supreme Court has clearly and vehemently
established the limited circumstances when parol evidence may be
introduced to vary a deed that contains a significant recital,32 precedent
wrongly expanded and misapplied in Raymond.
Finally, the article will culminate in a survey of the deleterious impact that
the Raymond case has had and why, from this author’s standpoint, it is critical

27. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (“Property possessed by either spouse during or on
dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”).
28. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1968) (describing a husband deeding land
to wife based on fear of his son claiming the property through inheritance).
29. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
30. Kahn v. Kahn, 58 S.W. 825, 826 (Tex. 1900). Of course, this would certainly apply to
husband as well.
31. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 910.
32. Id. at 911.
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to understand the failure of the Raymond court’s analysis and, if not
specifically overruled, why Raymond must be avoided.
II. RAYMOND V. RAYMOND,

THE OPINION AND ITS PREDECESSORS

In June of 1987, Brenda Raymond and Frank Raymond Jr. married,
becoming husband and wife.33 Prior to marriage, husband owned two
pieces of property, one being a lot in Lake Jackson,34 clearly his separate
property, having been owned by him prior to marriage.35 It was on this
separate property lot of husband’s where the couple built a home during
their marriage.36
Per wife’s request,37 “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an
undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property.”38 Upon
divorce, the trial court determined that the Lake Jackson property,
encompassing the home, was husband’s separate property and awarded the
Lake Jackson property to him, confirming his separate ownership.39 Wife
appealed this decision and other aspects of the divorce decree, as well.40
A. Theory One—The Raymond Court Focuses on the Interspousal Transfer in
Rejecting the Parties’ Position That Parol Evidence Can Be Used to Rebut the
Gift Presumption
That the Raymond transfer was interspousal underlies the appellate court’s
first theory in its attempt to distinguish Raymond from those cases that
allowed parol evidence of intent as a matter of course.41 As noted in the
Introduction, supra Part I, the appellate court in Raymond puts great stock in

33. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79.
34. Id.
35. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (establishing property owned prior to marriage as separate
property); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(1) (“[S]eparate property consists of: (1) the property
owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage . . . .”).
36. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79.
37. The First Court describes this as “Brenda’s urging” in its opinion. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. (appealing the trial court “overruling certain points of error in the motion for a new
trial because the motion was not verified” and the trial court “not requiring reimbursement to the
community estate for funds spent on [husband’s] separate real property”).
41. Id. at 80–81.
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the mode of transfer, being interspousal rather than from or involving a
third party.42
Addressing the propriety of the trial court’s characterization of the Lake
Jackson property as husband’s separate property, the appellate court’s analysis
begins with the statement: “Both parties cite to cases holding that evidence
of a gift of separate property from one spouse to another can be rebutted by
evidence that a gift was not intended.”43 While the court recognizes that
appellant and appellee, both parties/sides of the Raymond case, are treating
the conveyance in question as a presumed gift that can be rebutted by
evidence of intent, the court, nonetheless deems the cases the parties’ cite in
support of this premise as inapplicable. Specifically, the Raymond court
attempts to distinguish the parties’ cites of In re Marriage of Morris44 and
Johnson v. Johnson45 by stating, those cases “deal with situations where one
spouse purchases real estate with his or her separate property, but both
spouses’ names appear as grantees on the deed from that sale.”46 The Raymond
court concedes that in such instance, “a rebuttable presumption is raised that the
spouse intended to give the other spouse an undivided one-half interest in
the property as a gift.”47 Yet the court ultimately determines that the
Raymond conveyance whether a presumed gift or not is irrefutably wife’s
separate property.48 While conceding that a rebuttable gift presumption
42. See id. at 81 (“After Frank and Brenda married, Frank executed a separate deed to Brenda
conveying an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property. Frank was the only grantor,
and Brenda was the only grantee.”).
43. Id. at 80 (citing In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000,
no pet.); Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ)). The
court’s acknowledgment that the parties ascribe to the notion that a gift presumption can be rebutted
is followed in the opinion by a footnote, numbered 1, which explains: “Both parties assume that the
deed, reciting a consideration of $10.00 ‘and other valuable consideration,’ evidenced proof of a gift.
We recognize that there is conflicting case law on whether this is evidence of a gift or of valuable
consideration.” Id. at n.1 (citing Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1990, no writ); Hall v. Barrett, 126 S.W.2d 1045, 1047 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1939, no writ)).
Thereafter, the court, within the footnote, cites two cases establishing that conflict—gift versus sale.
Id. The court goes on to explain, “Our holding on appellant’s points of error [in Raymond], however,
is the same regardless of whether the conveyance was a sale or gift. Therefore, we will assume, without
holding, that the conveyance [is] a gift.” Id. As discussed later, this statement appears to support the
rejected possibility that the Raymond conveyance document was ambiguous and begs the question,
“Why would the holding be the same?”
44. In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
45. Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ).
46. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308).
47. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308–09).
48. Id.
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is raised in Morris and Johnson, the court does not provide analysis
distinguishing those cases, but merely states, “Those are not the facts of the
present case.”49 Try as the Raymond court does, the cases upon which the
parties relied for the rebuttable presumption premise are neither easily nor
readily distinguishable from the Raymond facts.50
Close consideration of the parties’ cited cases of Morris and Johnson
establishes that the Raymond court’s conclusory reasoning is misguided.
Morris and Johnson involve a spouse’s separate property purchase, during
marriage, of property from a third party and a contemporaneous placement
of the non-purchasing spouse’s name on the deed evidencing the purchase
from the third party.51 In Morris, real property was purchased during marriage
with husband’s separate funds, and wife conceded that husband paid for the
property with separate funds while having the names of both husband and
wife placed on the deed.52 The Morris court recognized that such transaction
gives rise to the presumption that husband made a gift of half of the
property to the wife.53 However, the Morris court also recognized that “[i]n
order to rebut this presumption, evidence of the absence of an intent to
make a gift must be shown.”54 While the husband in Morris failed in his
appeal because he did not present proof of his intent, i.e., that he did not
intend to make a gift, the Morris court nevertheless recognizes husband’s
right to present parol evidence regarding his intent as to gift.
Johnson55 also cannot be so readily distinguished from Raymond.56 Prior
to marriage, the Johnson husband, without joining future wife, signed a
49. Id.
50. Compare In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 881 (noting the property in question “was
purchased . . . during the marriage, but was paid for entirely with [husband’s] separate funds” and the
deed was placed in both parties’ names), and Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308 (detailing that prior to marriage,
husband signed a contract to purchase a house in which he alone was named as the purchaser, and
shortly after marriage, “a deed was executed naming both husband and wife as grantees . . .
[notwithstanding that] husband paid the entire purchase price out of his separate funds”), with Raymond,
190 S.W.3d at 79 (summarizing that prior to marriage, husband bought the property in question, and
later during marriage, husband “executed a deed to [wife] conveying an undivided one-half interest” in
the property).
51. See In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 881 (evidencing the property “was purchased . . .
during the marriage, but was paid for entirely with [husband’s] separate funds”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975)).
55. See Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308 (demonstrating a deed executed naming both husband and
wife as grantees, even though husband paid the entire purchase price out of his separate funds).
56. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)
(showing husband owned property before marriage and was the only grantee identified on the deed).
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contract to purchase a home.57 The sale on the home closed after marriage,
husband paid the entirety of the purchase price, and the deed was placed in
the names of both husband and wife.58 Without questioning the propriety
of considering the parol evidence that was introduced, it was determined that,
based on parol evidence, the Johnson husband had no intent to make a gift to
the wife.59
The Raymond court attempts to distinguish that matter because husband in
Raymond did not make the purchase during marriage, but rather added the
wife’s name to a deed on property he already owned.60 Specifically,
husband in Raymond, conveyed “an undivided one-half interest in the
Lake Jackson property. Frank was the only grantor, and Brenda was the
only grantee.”61 What appears to be the distinguishing factor for the
Raymond court is that husband and wife were the only parties involved, an
interspousal transfer, rather than a third party transfer to both husband and
wife. Perhaps the Raymond court utilized this interspousal transfer to invoke
what they consider to be a different presumption, specifically:
When there has been a conveyance of property by one spouse to another
and a delivery of the deed, the presumption exists that it was the intention of the
grantor spouse to make the property the separate property of the grantee spouse and in
the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance cannot be
disturbed.62

The foregoing does not reference a gift presumption, but rather simply
pronounces that there is a presumption of intent on behalf of the grantor to
make the property the separate property of the grantee spouse. The Raymond
court’s approach seems to be based on Brothers v. Brothers.63 In Brothers, there
was an interspousal conveyance of an undivided fifty percent interest in a
parcel of real property, and the Brothers court stated:

57. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d at 308.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 309.
60. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 79, 81 (“Here, it is undisputed that [husband] owned the property
before the marriage . . . .”).
61. Id. at 81.
62. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication)).
63. Brothers v. Brothers, No. 14–96–00364–CV, 1997 WL 7012 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
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It has long been the settled law in Texas that a husband can execute a deed
directly to the wife and such conveyance, regardless of whether the property
conveyed is the husband’s separate property or community property causes
the property to become the wife’s separate property. This is so even though the
deed may not recite that the conveyance is for the wife’s sole and separate use. When there
has been a conveyance of property from the husband to the wife and a
delivery of the deed, the presumption exists that it was his intention to
make the property the separate property of the wife either by gift or by purchase,
and in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, such conveyance cannot be
disturbed.64

The Brothers court does not require an express/significant recital for
application of the rule regarding the necessity of fraud, accident, or mistake
to vary a writing by parol evidence.65 Rather, Brothers and Raymond seem to
imply that the interspousal nature of the conveyance itself is enough to
establish an irrebuttable presumption that the conveyed property is now the
donee spouse’s separate property absent a showing of fraud, accident, or
mistake which would allow controverting parol evidence.66 Under this
theory borrowed from Brothers, the Raymond court would not allow parol
evidence unless threshold evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake was
presented.67
There are problems with this somewhat simplistic interspousal conveyance
approach. First, the Brothers opinion is an unpublished opinion from the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals which the Fourteenth Court itself refused to
64. Id. at *1–2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first citing Tittle v. Tittle, 220 S.W.2d 637,
642 (Tex. 1949); then citing Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. 1943); Taylor v. Hollingsworth,
176 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1943); McAdams v. Ogletree, 348 S.W.2d 75, 84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Fitchett v. Bustamente, 329 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1959, writ
ref’d n.r.e.); Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ); Hartman v.
Hartman, 217 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Austin 1949, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Molloy v. Brower, 171 S.W.
1079, 1079 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1914, writ ref’d); Bird v. Lester, 166 S.W. 112, 112 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1914, writ ref’d); Kin Kaid v. Lee, 119 S.W. 342, 343 (Tex. App.—Houston 1909, writ ref’d);
and then citing Dyer v. Dyer, 616 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd)).
65. Id. at *2.
66. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (focusing on the parties’ marital relationship in the
conveyance, rather than the recitals of deed, to evoke the presumption); Brothers, 1997 WL 7012, at *2
(stating that the direct nature in which the conveyance occurs evokes the presumption).
67. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first
tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d
426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); Massey v. Massey 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
writ denied))).
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follow in Stearns v. Marten stating: “The parties have not cited and research
has not revealed any precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas
determining this issue. Lisa has cited a 1997 unpublished case from this
court, Brothers v. Brothers . . . . But, that case has no precedential value.”68
Moreover, the Brothers opinion does not mention anything about the parol
evidence rule and does not support the Raymond court’s use of the parol
evidence rule to prohibit admission of evidence related to intent.69 While
on the one hand seeming to eschew the need for an express recital because
Raymond presents an interspousal transfer, the Raymond court nonetheless
recognizes that, “A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the
deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.”70
This leads to what might be referred to as the Raymond court’s second
possible theory for denying parol evidence, that the Raymond conveyance
language was significant.
B. Theory Two—The Raymond Language of Conveyance Is Significant, Thereby
Barring Consideration of Parol Evidence Absent Accident, Fraud, or Mistake
While the Raymond court accepts that fraud, accident, or mistake is
needed to contradict express recitals71 in a conveyancing document such as a
deed, the court nonetheless fails to grasp the meaning of the very term used
in the opinion, express recitals.72 Or, perhaps the Raymond court, without
specifically saying it, deemed husband’s conveyance by deed, of “an undivided
one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property. Frank was the only grantor, and
Brenda was the only grantee[,]” to be a significant recital.73

68. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no
pet.) (first citing Brothers, 1997 WL 7012; then citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7).
69. See Brothers, 1997 WL 7012, at *1–2 (relying on “long . . . settled law in Texas” rather than
the parol evidence rule).
70. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (citing Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 431–
32; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405).
71. See id. (“Absent such evidence [of fraud, accident, or mistake], the trial court erred in
considering parol evidence of intent.” (citing Dalton v. Pruett, 483 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1972, no writ))).
72. See id. (focusing on “latent or patent ambiguity” with regards to the deed instead of on
expressed recitals (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.
1995))).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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Express recitals are sometimes referenced as significant recitals,74 and
will be used interchangeably in this article as it is by the courts. As will be
discussed infra at note 232–33, the Raymond language conveyancing an
undivided half interest cannot be considered a significant recital and
accordingly the Raymond conveyance was devoid of express/significant
recitals, just as were the conveyances in Morris75 and Johnson.76
The court attempts to distinguish the Raymond circumstances from
Morris and Johnson because the Lake Jackson lot was owned solely by
husband prior to marriage and he alone added wife’s name after marriage.77
Specifically, the Raymond court casts significance upon the fact that “Frank
was the only grantor, and Brenda was the only grantee.”78 This observation
is an apparent attempt by the court to distinguish the Raymond facts, because
the conveyance was not from a third party as was the situation in Johnson and
Morris.79 The Raymond court then goes on to identify the cases of Massey v.
Massey,80 Coker v. Coker,81 Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans,82 and others referenced
therein as controlling because those cases hold that “parol evidence is not
admissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous document.”83 Yes, Massey
and Coker, do stand for the proposition that parol evidence cannot be
used to vary a document that is unambiguous (i.e., if a document is
unambiguous, intent is irrelevant).84
74. The Raymond court, instead of distinguishing the cases on the existence of express or
significant recitals, distinguishes the cases on the fact that husband conveyed separate property owned
before the marriage, not property acquired from a third party during marriage. Id.
75. See In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
(“[B]y acknowledging that [husband] intentionally placed the property in both of their names, he had
exhibited a specific intent to make a gift to [wife].”).
76. See Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ) (noting
a deed was executed naming both husband and wife as grantees, but the husband paid the entire
purchase price from his separate funds).
77. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“[I]t is undisputed that Frank owned the property before the
marriage, and he was the only grantee named on that deed. Therefore, it was his separate property
from the inception.”).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 81–82.
80. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
81. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983).
82. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1970).
83. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405).
84. See Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (emphasis added) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary
the terms of an unambiguous document.” (citing Kennedy v. Kennedy, 619 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ))); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 (“In construing a written
contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed
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In Massey, the property in question was two parcels of real property in
Colorado County, Texas and some bank stock.85 Husband asserted these
properties were his separate property having been gifts, even though the
deeds to the real property recited a sale and were accompanied by an
$180,000 promissory note establishing that the property was acquired
via a purchase during marriage.86 The sale documents unequivocally
established that the subject properties were purchased during the Massey’s
marriage.87 Husband in Massey wanted parol evidence introduced to vary the
sale terms, to show that the property was gifted to him by his family.88 Massey
husband explained that the sale language was incorporated only to escape
gift tax consequences.89 The sale language was deemed by the court to be
the “express language of these documents, which recite consideration, the
transfers of property, which occurred during the parties’ marriage, were
bargained-for exchanges.”90
The sale in Massey was unambiguously established by documentary
evidence.91 The Massey case has exacting, express, language of a sale in the
conveyance document.92 In contrast, the Raymond conveyance document
specifies neither a gift to the wife nor a sale to the wife.93 All that exists in
the Raymond conveyance document is the simple transfer, naming the wife and
reciting a symbolic $10 as consideration,94 giving rise to a rebuttable gift
presumption.95 Massey and Raymond are not the same thing at all.
in the instrument.” (citing R & P Enter. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.
1980); City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968))).
85. Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 395.
86. Id. at 405.
87. See id. (reinforcing the idea that property obtained during marriage through “bargained-for
exchanges” rather than by gift is property belonging to the community).
88. See id. (finding “appellant offered the testimony” of family members in an attempt to
convince the court the transactions “were made to look like credit transactions in order to avoid gift
taxes”).
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See id. (“[T]he trial court correctly excluded the parol evidence and gave effect to the
unambiguous terms of the written instruments . . . .”).
92. See id. (“Under the express language of these documents, which recite consideration, the
transfers of property, which occurred during the parties’ marriage, were bargained-for exchanges.”).
93. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet.) (outlining the terms of the conveyance).
94. See id. (explaining “Frank executed a deed to Brenda conveying an undivided one-half
interest in the Lake Jackson property”).
95. See Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1968) (illustrating a husband executing a
deed to his wife although not intending it as a gift to her but for other reasons); Johnson v. Johnson,
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While the court in the Raymond opinion recognizes that ambiguities within
the conveyancing documents are a basis for allowing parol evidence, they
reason that such does not control Raymond because there is no ambiguity and
accordingly, did not allow the use of the parol evidence.96 Your author does
not ascribe to the theory that parol evidence should have been allowed in
Raymond because of an ambiguity; rather, she is of the mind that because
there was no significant recital, parol evidence should be allowed.
The Raymond court’s reference to ambiguities is additionally perplexing
in light of footnote number one, which acknowledges that the Raymond
parties ascribe to the notion that a gift presumption can be rebutted, going
on to explain “[b]oth parties assume that the deed, reciting a consideration
of $10.00 ‘and other valuable consideration,’ evidenced proof of a gift. We
recognize that there is conflicting case law on whether this [the language
evidencing consideration] is evidence of a gift or of valuable consideration.”97
It seems the court itself sets up the very ambiguity it denied. Thereafter, the
Raymond court elucidates within footnote one, citing two cases establishing that
conflict between gift versus sale, explaining that their “holding on
appellant’s points of error [in Raymond], however, is the same regardless of
whether the conveyance was a sale or a gift. Therefore, we will assume,
without holding, that the conveyance is a gift.”98 Inexplicably, this statement
appears to support the court’s rejected possibility that the Raymond
conveyance document was ambiguous.
The Raymond court cites National Union Fire Ins. Co., v. CBI Industries Inc.99
to reiterate the generality that testimony of intent “can be introduced only if
there is latent or patent ambiguity.”100 In the National Union case, at issue
was a clause known as an “absolute pollution exclusion.”101 The Texas
584 S.W.2d 307, 308–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ) (“[T]he deed named husband and wife
as grantees . . . [thus creating] a presumption that the husband intended to give his wife an undivided
one-half interest in the residence.” (citing Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Carriere v. Bodungen, 500 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1973, no writ))).
96. See Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (“[P]arol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of an
unambiguous document.” (citing Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405)).
97. Id. at 81 n.1 (citing Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990,
no writ); Hall v. Barrett, 126 S.W.2d 1045, 1047 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1939, no writ).
98. Id.
99. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., v. CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995).
100. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d at 520).
101. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d at 518–19 (discussing the role of parol evidence in
contract disputes and explaining the meaning of an absolute pollution exclusion clause). The National
Union policy contained the following exclusion:
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Supreme Court in National Union reversed the intermediate court that had
remanded the trial court’s summary judgment for further discovery.102 The
Texas Supreme Court determined that reversal was necessary because all
facts relevant to the interpretation of the clause were already in the record
thus obviating the need for discovery.103 The Texas Supreme Court held:
“The ambiguity must become evident when the contract is read in context
of the surrounding circumstances, not after parol evidence of intent is
admitted to create an ambiguity.”104 In contract construction parol
evidence is not permitted to create an ambiguity;105 with this your author
has no quarrel. However, immediately after citing National Union, the
Raymond court, concludes that when a spouse fails to establish an
ambiguity, fraud, or mistake, the gift presumption must prevail,106 citing
Dalton v. Pruett,107 Brothers v. Brothers, and Dyer v. Dyer.108 The Raymond court’s
leap of logic will be examined.
It is understandable why Dalton v. Pruett led the Raymond court to reach its
conclusion. In Dalton v. Pruett, prior to marriage husband owned a lot and
constructed a home on it.109 After marriage, husband, for recited
consideration of $8,500.00, conveyed the home to his wife.110 The deed
did not specify whether the $8,500 was from wife’s sole and separate
property or that the property was being conveyed for her sole and separate

This policy does not apply to . . . any Personal Injury or Property Damage arising out of the actual
or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants, anywhere in the world; . . .
“Pollutants” means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste material. Waste materials include materials
which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Id at 519.
102. Id. at 520, 522.
103. See id. at 522 (“The language in this pollution exclusion is clear and susceptible of only one
possible interpretation in this case. Because there are no latent or patent ambiguities in the policies,
there are no fact issues that merit discovery.”).
104. Id. at 521.
105. See id. at 521. (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the meaning of
the explicit language of the parties’ written agreement.” (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank,
317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1958); Lewis v. E. Tex. Fin. Co., 146 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Tex. 1941))).
106. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet.) (analyzing the presumption created when a spouse conveys real property to the other spouse).
107. Dalton v. Pruett, 483 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ).
108. Dyer v. Dyer, 616 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism’d).
109. Dalton, 483 S.W.2d at 927–28.
110. Id. at 928.
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use.111 The Dalton court, relying on Pevehouse v. Pevehouse112 and Forman v.
Glasgow,113 concluded the home was wife’s separate property, even without
recital in the deed that the property was paid for by wife’s separate funds
or was being conveyed as the wife’s separate property or for her separate
use.114 The Dalton court further said that it made no difference whether the
property conveyed by husband to wife is community or husband’s separate;
it will by conveyance from husband to wife, alone, be considered wife’s
separate property.115 Finally, the Dalton v. Pruett court referenced the
presumption that husband, by conveyance, intended to make a gift to
wife and then opined that absent fraud or mistake, the presumption could
not be rebutted.116 While the Houston court’s opinion in Raymond can
perhaps be understood in the solitary light of Dalton v. Pruett, the cases
cited in Dalton v. Pruett and reiterated in Raymond as support do little to
sustain their holdings.
Dalton v. Pruett depends on Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, where husband and wife
owned community property that was, during marriage, conveyed to the wife
as her separate property.117 As evidenced by the opinion, the Pevehouse
conveyance was by significant recital, express language, establishing wife’s
ownership, thus:
Originally the appellant and appellee owned as their community property the
west one-half (W/2) of Section Ten (10), Block J–S, in Lubbock County,
Texas. Long before this divorce proceeding, W. M. Pevehouse deeded
this land to Myrtle Pevehouse as her separate property. . . . The deed recited
that W. M. Pevehouse for and in consideration of the sum of $500 to him in
hand paid by Mrs. Pevehouse out of her separate estate and funds acquired by her
from inheritance as follows: “Cash paid, the receipt of which hereby is
acknowledged and confessed.” Then it proceeded to grant, sell and convey the
property to Mrs. Myrtle Pevehouse in her individual and separate right, and further
111. Id.
112. Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1957, writ dism’d).
113. Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ).
114. See Dalton, 483 S.W.2d at 928 (highlighting a long-recognized rule in Texas that a husband’s
deed to wife causes the property to become wife’s separate property, regardless of whether the deed
recites it as such).
115. See id. at 928–29 (addressing the presumption that property, whether community or
husband’s separate property, conveyed from husband to wife becomes wife’s separate property).
116. See id. at 929 (“When there has been a conveyance of property[,] . . . the presumption exists
that it was [the spouse’s] intention to make the property the separate property [of the other
spouse] . . . .”).
117. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 771.
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provided: “and I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrator
to Warrant and Forever Defend, all and singular the said premises unto the
said Mrs. Myrtle Pevehouse in her separate right, her heirs and assigns, against every
person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part
hereof.”118

The Pevehouse court made clear that when a recital119 unquestionably
establishes that property was meant to be conveyed as separate, such a
recital can only be rebutted by establishing the “conveyance was procured
by fraud, mistake[,] or undue influence.”120 The appellate court in
Pevehouse determined that the husband’s testimony, the parol evidence,
should not have been considered by the trial court as the document
including the significant recitals was controlling.121 The appellate court
rendered judgment that the property in question was the separate property of
the wife as established in the document of conveyance which could not be
varied absent fraud, mistake, or undue influence.122
That being said, there are general statements within
Pevehouse, emanating from early editions of Texas Jurisprudence123

118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. The court refers to it as a “specific declaration.” See id. at 772 (explaining that specific
declarations of this kind create presumptions the court will be unlikely to overturn).
120. Id.
121. The testimony, as related in the opinion, is some of the more colorful in cases such as this.
Accordingly, that portion of the opinion is worthy of being quoted:
Appellee was asked by his attorney if he ever gave his wife the farm for love and affection. He
did not deny giving the farm for love and affection but stated he had no love and affection for
her and never had any love or affection for her although the record reflects they had been man
and wife for forty-two years at the time of this separation and had two children that are now
grown and married. He was further asked by his attorney if he at any time since 1932 executed a
deed of conveyance to his wife for this half section of land intending to convey title to her. His
answer was, “No.” He did not remember much about the deed and did not know whether he
gave the deed to Mrs. Pevehouse or not. Appellee acknowledged: “If I signed it and if I
acknowledged it, why it would have been for the purpose that she could have it.” We think this
undisputed record shows appellee signed, acknowledged and delivered the deed in question. This
deed cannot be varied simply by the appellee testifying he never executed a deed of conveyance
to his wife for this land intending to convey title to her.
Id. at 773.
122. Id. at 774.
123. See id. at 772 (“Husband's Deed to Wife—There is no reason why the husband may not execute
a deed directly to his wife. The validity of such a deed is determined by general principles. There must be
present the essentials, such as consideration and delivery.” (citing 23 Tex. Jur., p. 157, § 128 (current version
at 39 Tex. Jur. 3d Family Law § 233 (2017)))).
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and early cases124 that do not make the limitation on parol evidence so
inextricably tied to the existence of significant recitals. However, it
cannot be overlooked that the Texas Supreme Court case cited in support of
those general statements in Texas Jurisprudence, Belkin v. Ray,125 very clearly
contains a significant recital in the conveyance from husband to wife; as the
Belkin court explained: “Harry Marks conveyed this property to his wife, Ray
Marks. This deed recites a cash consideration of $1 and love and affection.126 It
also recites that the property is conveyed to Ray Marks as her separate
estate.”127 The Belkin case belies any assertion that a conveyance without a
significant recital, between husband and wife, establishes a gift presumption
that cannot be rebutted absent fraud or mistake of other equitable
grounds.128
The Houston First Court of Appeals, in Raymond, seems to have
juxtaposed contract cases dealing with ambiguities with cases regarding
significant recitals and interspousal gifts, while ignoring the difference
between interspousal conveyances that contain significant recitals and those
that do not.
The Raymond court also cites Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, along with the
previously discussed Massey for the proposition that “[a] spouse who is a party
to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to
contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence
of fraud, accident, or mistake.”129 However, it cannot go unnoticed that
Henry S. Miller, as other cases cited in Raymond, dealt with a conveyance

124. See Forman v. Glasgow, 219 S.W.2d 845, 846–47 (Tex. App.—Waco 1949, no writ)
(holding property that was clearly community was conveyed for consideration of $5.00 by husband to
wife and became part of wife’s separate estate, even though the deed, while mentioning the meager
consideration, contained no statement that the funds were separate or that the property was being
conveyed either as a gift or to the wife’s separate estate).
125. Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1943).
126. Id. at 165 (emphasis added). These words, “love and affection,” have been understood as
showing intent to make a gift. See generally Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 772 (discussing which declarations
within a conveyance create certain presumptions).
127. Belkin, 176 S.W.2d at 165 (emphasis added).
128. See Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d at 772 (“The effect of the husband’s deed to the wife . . . is to
constitute the estate the separate property of the grantee. The instrument could have no other meaning,
and this is true whether it recites that the conveyance is for the sole separate use of the grantee or
not.”).
129. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)
(citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex.1970); Massey v. Massey,
807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
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including a significant recital.130 Specifically, the Miller court noted that the
deed “recited a consideration of $1.00 and a vendor’s lien note for $8,000.00,
paid and to be paid out of Nancy Shoaf’s ‘sole and separate estate,’ and that this
property was conveyed to her as her ‘sole and separate estate.’”131
The foregoing analysis of cases cited by the Raymond court belie the
court’s refusal to consider parol evidence. This assertion is strengthened
by other cases yet to be discussed, and basic trust and evidentiary principles
that underlie the well-established rules regarding interspousal
conveyances.
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF RESULTING TRUSTS AND PAROL EVIDENCE
OVERLAP A SPOUSE’S RIGHT TO OFFER PROOF OF SEPARATE OWNERSHIP
A. Basic Trust Principles Support the Use of Parol Evidence in Circumstances Such
As Were Presented in Raymond
While not frequently referenced or discussed, the underpinnings for the
rules governing interspousal gifts are the rules governing purchase money
resulting trusts.132 It is important to understand these rules not only for
the purpose of application, but also to understand and grasp the historical
context of and the gravitas attached to presumptions arising from
interspousal transfers, so readily used, and occasionally ignored, by bench
and bar alike.
1.

Restatement of Trusts §§ 440, 441

The general rule governing resulting trusts provides, “Where a transfer of
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a
resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is
paid, except as stated in [sections] 441, 442 and 444.”133 This rule means
that when a person pays (the payor) for property, but legal title is passed to
one that has not paid, a trust results to the benefit of the payor who will then
hold the beneficial title.134 Pursuant to section 441, such a trust will not
result “if the person by whom the purchase price is paid manifests an

130. Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 428–29.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 440–443 (AM. LAW INST. 1935) (referencing
rules applicable to transfers of property where a resulting trust arises).
133. Id. § 440.
134. Id.
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intention that no resulting trust should arise.”135 This intention would,
of course, be established by parol evidence explaining the payor’s intention
at the time of the conveyance.
The foregoing are the general resulting trust rules and are inapplicable
to those in a confidential relationship such as husband and wife. The
exceptions mentioned in section 440, and quoted in the introduction to this
portion of the article, along with sections 442 and 443, provide the base by
which interspousal conveyances are analyzed.
2.

Restatement of Trusts §§ 442, 443

Husbands and wives, and others within close relationships, are subject
to Restatement of Trusts section 442,136 which provides:
Purchase in the Name of a Relative. Where a transfer of property is made
to one person and the purchase price is paid by another and the transferee is a
wife, child or other natural object of bounty137 of the person by whom the

135. Id. § 441.
136. See id. § 442 (outlining property transfers between relatives or spouses).
137. The phrase “other natural object of bounty of the person by whom purchase price is paid,”
can give rise to interesting questions within family law cases. However, delving into who might be the
natural object of one’s bounty is beyond the scope of this article. For the curious, the comments at
section 442 do offer some elucidation, thus:
The rule stated in this Section [442] is applicable where the payor and transferee respectively
are in the relation of husband and wife; father and child; mother and child; father-in-law and sonin-law; grandparent and grandchild. It applies to the relation of parent and child although the
child is an illegitimate or an adopted child. It is immaterial that the child is an adult. It applies
also where the payor stands in loco parentis to the transferee; that is, where the payor whether or
not related to the transferee has assumed to act in the place of a parent of the transferee.
It does not apply where the payor and transferee respectively are wife and husband, [to this,
your author takes exception as wives/women are, throughout the Texas Family Code, treated
without regard to gender in matters of property] or child and parent. It does not apply where the
payor does not stand in loco parentis to the transferee merely because the payor and transferee
respectively are brothers or sisters, uncle or aunt, or nephew or niece.
It applies where the payor is a man and is engaged to be married to the transferee, but not
where the transferee is already married to another person. It does not apply to unmarried persons
unlawfully cohabiting.
b) Effect of the rule. The fact that the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty
of the payor is more than merely a circumstance tending to rebut the inference of a resulting trust.
It is of itself a circumstance sufficient to raise an inference that a gift was intended, and the burden
is upon the payor seeking to enforce a resulting trust to prove that he did not intend to make a
gift to the transferee (see [section] 443). If the transferee is related to the payor, but is not in such
a relation as to be a natural object of bounty of the payor, this circumstance is not enough to raise
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purchase price is paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter manifests
an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the
property.138

Per the foregoing, application to the wife (or child) is specified, thereby
barring a section 440 resulting trust in favor of the payor; rather, a gift to the
wife or child is presumed.139
So, if a spouse pays for property with their separate property and places it
in the name of the other spouse, a gift to the named spouse will be presumed.
This is inapposite of section 440 establishing a resulting trust, but it is not a
rebuttal to section 440 as found in section 441. Rather, section 442 is a
presumption unto itself that can only be rebutted by section 443, thus:
Rebutting the Presumption of a Gift to a Relative. Where a transfer of
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, and
the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the person
by whom the purchase price is paid, and the latter manifests an intention that
the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the property, a resulting
trust arises.140

That is, even if the one holding the beneficial interest is the natural object of
the payor’s bounty, a trust could result if such was intended at the time title
passed. The payor’s intention at the time of the conveyance would,
necessarily, be established by parol evidence.
Section 443 of The Restatement of Trusts makes clear that the
presumption of gift may be rebutted in the exact situation that arose in the
Raymond case.141 However, the Raymond case is a departure from the
established rule because the parol evidence offered by husband was
barred and not considered by the appellate court in making its decision.
While the Restatement of Trusts establishes the basic presumptions
which arise when a conveyance is made to one person and the purchase
price was paid by another, these sections do not encompass the effect
of significant recitals within the conveyancing documents.
an inference that a gift was intended, but it is a circumstance which can be shown with other
circumstances as tending to rebut the inference that a resulting trust arises . . . .
Id. § 442 cmt. a–b.
138. Id. § 442 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 443.
141. See id. (outlining ways to rebut the gift presumption in conveyances to relatives).
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IV. MARITAL PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION AND APPLICATION
OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION IN LIGHT OF
RESULTING TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The Texas Family Code provides that all “[p]roperty possessed by either
spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community
property.”142 This is the presumption whether property is held in the name
of husband, wife, or both spouses and it applies to all property possessed.
This is the beginning point of every divorce case—all property is presumed
community.143
A. The Community Property Presumption Can Be Rebutted and in Fact Supplanted
by the Facts of a Conveyance
While beginning with the presumption that all property held by the
spouses is community, spouses have the right to rebut the community
property presumption and prove any property as separate.144 This right
was most clearly established, more than eighty-years ago, by the case of Foster
v. Christensen.145 In Foster v. Christensen, land was conveyed by wife’s parents to
husband and wife, and daughter/wife and her husband executed a promissory
note.146 The deed did not reflect by recital or otherwise that wife had a
separate interest in the property.147 However, when faced with the
possibility that this property would be lost in husband’s bankruptcy, wife
asserted that the cash down payment was made, and future payments would
be made, from her separate monies.148 At trial, wife was denied the right to
present this evidence.149 The Texas Supreme Court held, “The wife’s
142. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a).
143. See id. § 3.003 (establishing the community property presumption).
144. See id. § 3.003(b) (“The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate
property is clear and convincing evidence.”).
145. Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, holding approved). Foster
v. Christensen is a complicated case wherein husband’s bankruptcy filing and loss of the property wife
claimed as separate also involved wife’s parents, who sought to repossess the property in question
because wife had not paid for the property per agreement. Id. at 248. Wife’s right to establish and
thereby protect such as separate property, so parents could claim under her right, was recognized. Id.
at 249–52.
146. Id. at 248.
147. See id. (“The deed contained no statement that the land was intended to be the separate
property of either of the grantees.”).
148. Id. at 249. In Foster, wife’s parents, who were claiming property through their daughter’s
separate interest, sought to repossess said property and eliminate it from husband’s bankruptcy estate.
Id. at 248.
149. Id. at 249.
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separate ownership of property, although standing in the name of her
husband or appearing on record to be community property, may be proven
as any other fact by any competent evidence, including parol evidence,
surrounding circumstances, and declarations of the parties.”150 Very
simply, if it is established that consideration for such property was paid by a
spouse’s separate funds, and no gift to the other spouse was intended,151
the property is the separate property of the paying spouse. While Foster v.
Christensen did not resolve the character of the subject property, it did
establish a spouse’s right to prove the separate character of property claimed
to be separate.152 Even though this case did not involve the dissolution
of a marriage, the right to prove the separate character of property
recognized therein has been steadily applied by Texas courts in matters of
divorce and probate.153
Likewise, when property is from a third party to the spouses, in what
appears to be a gift to both rather than a purchase, parol evidence can be
used to rebut the gift presumption. In Von Hutchins v. Pope,154 mother
deeded the property to her brother, the uncle of mother’s married daughter,
with the request that the uncle, after mother’s death, deed the property as a
gift to the married daughter.155 The deed from the uncle named daughter’s
husband as well as daughter; nonetheless, parol evidence was allowed to

150. Id. (first citing McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 154 S.W. 1157, 1158–59
(Tex. 1913); Presidio Mining Co. v. Bullis, 4 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. 1887); Carter v. Bolin, 30 S.W. 1084,
1085 (Tex. App.—Austin 1895, no writ); SPEER’S LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS (3d ed.) §§ 428–429; then
citing Cummins v. Cummins, 224 S.W. 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1920, no writ); SPEER’S LAW
OF MARITAL RIGHTS (3d ed.) §§ 406, 428, 429, 437).
151. In Foster v. Christensen, no presumed gift to husband, by his being named, was asserted. This
may have been a result of the era in which the case arose, when gifts from wives to husbands were not
given the deference of gifts from husbands to wives, or it may have been that any interest husband
might have had would have been subject to claims through the bankruptcy trustee.
152. See id. at 253 (holding that a spouse should be allowed to offer proof of separate property
as evidence when the character of the property is at issue).
153. See Nesmith v. Berger, 64 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied)
(looking to appellant’s prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, which asserted all property be separate,
as sufficient evidence of nonexistent community property); Orr v. Pope, 400 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1966, no writ) (“It is settled that property acquired during marriage takes its status
as separate or community property at the time of its acquisition, and that such status is fixed by the
facts or circumstances by its acquisition at that time.” (citing Smith v. Buss, 144 S.W.2d 529, 531–32
(Tex. 1940); Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. 1952))).
154. Von Hutchins v. Pope, 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1961, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 645.
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establish the gift was meant for daughter, alone.156
It is well accepted that a spouse may prove the separate character of
property when conveyed by a third party to either or both spouses, as
was shown in the previously discussed case of Johnson157 which was even
recognized by the Raymond court.158 The problem, in terms of the Raymond
opinion, is the court’s divergent view of transfers between the spouses.
B. Deeds From One Spouse to the Other, Transferring the Entirety or a Portion,
Give Rise to a Gift Presumption Which, in the Absence of a Significant Recital,
Can Be Rebutted
As noted above, if there is property in existence at the dissolution of the
marriage, the entirety of the property will be presumed community.159
However, in a phenomenon that seems unique to Texas community
property cases, the presumption and the accompanying burden of proof can
switch by virtue of a simple conveyance.160 For example, when a deed
is from the husband grantor to the wife as grantee and contains no
significant recital, the normal community property presumption is replaced
by the presumption that husband is making a gift to wife, whether the
deeded property be separate or community,161 in the absence of parol
evidence to rebut the presumption of gift; and of course, vice versa, be it
wife to husband.162 If the conveying spouse offers parol evidence disputing
156. Id. at 644–45.
157. See Johnson v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ)
(validating parol evidence indicating that property purchased with separate property assets and
thereafter conveyed by deed naming both husband and wife as grantees was in fact separate property).
158. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet.).
159. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (“Property possessed by either spouse during or on
dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”).
160. Compare id. § 3.001(2) (stating property acquired by gift during marriage is separate property),
with id. § 3.005 (presuming interspousal gifts of property to include all income and property that arise
from such property).
161. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975) (proffering the rebuttable
presumption of gift where husband purchases community property in the name of both spouses with
separate property assets during marriage); In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 883–84 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (affirming the rejection of husband’s argument rebutting presumption
of gift); City Nat’l Bank of Eastland v. Kinnebrew, 190 S.W. 536, 538 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1916,
writ ref’d) (clarifying that husband’s payment on wife’s debt against wife’s separate property and taking
of deed to said property in wife’s name constituted evidence of gift).
162. See Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (discussing
the shifting burdens of proof and the rebuttable presumption of separate property gifted between
spouses).
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the gift, the conveying spouse has the burden to establish that the property
conveyed was not meant as a gift.163
This principle of Texas marital property law has long been recognized.
The oft-cited Texas Supreme Court case of Cockerham v. Cockerham164
presents most unusual circumstances from whence an assertion of the gift
presumption arose. In Cockerham, prior to his marriage, husband owned an
undisputed separate property interest in half of a 320-acre tract; the other
half belonged to husband’s brother.165 During marriage, husband
purchased his brother’s share and, through a complicated transaction, the
entirety of the property was conveyed to husband and wife.166 The trustee
in bankruptcy argued that by conveying (or reconveying) the entirety to
husband and wife, husband could be presumed to have made a gift to wife
of one half of his separate property half.167 Nonetheless, the Texas
Supreme Court recognized that the gift presumption “can be rebutted by
evidence clearly establishing there was no intention to make a gift.”168 The
conveyance of the entirety of the tract was found by the trial court, and
ultimately upheld by the Texas Supreme Court, to be “a means of
convenience provided by law to complete the purchase of the whole and
secure a loan thereon.”169 Half of the 320-acre tract was recognized as
husband’s separate property, while the remaining 160-acres was recognized
as a community acquisition.170
This holding of the Texas Supreme Court was preceded by a long line of

163. See id. at 432 (discussing the pleadings filed by wife to rebut the presumption of a gift she
made to husband by arguing “she had executed the deed under duress and that she did not intend to
make a gift”).
164. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975).
165. Id. at 166–67.
166. Id. at 167.
167. See id. at 167–68 (“The trustee alternatively contends that if the husband had a separate
property interest . . . he made a gift of an undivided one-half of such separate property interest to his
wife . . . . [I]t is presumed he intended the interest placed in his wife to be a gift.” (citing Smith v.
Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 314–15 (1856); Tucker v. Carr, 39 Tex. 98, 99 (1873); Tate v. Tate, 299 S.W. 310,
311–12 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1927, no writ); Carriere v. Bodungen, 500 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1973, no writ); Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1972, no writ); 1 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 92 (2d ed. 1956))).
168. Id. at 168 (citing Strahan, 16 Tex. at 314–15; Dean v. Dean, 214 S.W. 505, 507–08 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1919, no writ); Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d at 316; Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 258
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); 1 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 92
(2d ed. 1956)).
169. Id. at 167.
170. Id. at 168.
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cases, including, as were cited in Cockerham: Smith v. Strahan;171 Dean v.
Dean;172 Hampshire v. Hampshire;173 and Paterson v. Metzing.174 Likewise,
Cockerham has been followed by a good many cases espousing this same
principle, that a gift presumption, when arising from a conveyance that does
not include a significant recital, can be rebutted by parol evidence.
Including: Roberts v. Roberts;175 Harrison v. Harrison;176 and, Reaves v.
Reaves.177
This history brings us to the Raymond case. By way of reminder, the Raymond
case involved husband’s placement of wife’s name on the title to a piece
of property husband owned prior to marriage and the appellate court’s
holding that parol evidence could not be used to show the intent husband
had in adding wife’s name to the deed.178 Rather, the appellate court held
the conveyance yielded an irrebuttable presumption of gift to the wife and,
absent fraud or mistake in the conveyance itself, barred presentment of
parol evidence.179
171. Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 322 (1856) (finding the rational foundation of gift
presumption when “the purchase is intended as a provision for the [receiving spouse]” and explaining
that this presumption is “more easily rebutted than it would be where the [receiving spouse] has no
interest in community property, and a very restricted right to separate” property)
172. Dean v. Dean, 214 S.W. 505, 508 (Tex. App.—Austin 1919, no writ) (holding lower court
erred by refusing to permit husband to testify that his reason for placing the deed in wife’s name was
that his employment as a brakeman was dangerous, and if he died, he wanted wife to be able to sell the
property without probate concerns; the court found this testimony material on the issue of whether
appellant-husband intended to gift the property to wife).
173. Hampshire v. Hampshire, 485 S.W.2d 314, 316 (holding husband’s testimonial denial of
intent to give wife an interest in his house and lot was inconclusive to establish that he did not intend
to make a gift and merely raised a question of fact that the trial court resolved in favor of wife—a
finding upheld on appeal).
174. Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ)
(confirming the gift presumption can be rebutted by evidence clearly establishing an intention to make
a gift, but ultimately holding that plaintiff’s evidence was factually insufficient to rebut the
presumption) (citing Dean, 214 S.W. at 508).
175. Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (noting gift
presumption is rebuttable by parol evidence to establish deed procurement through duress or undue
influence).
176. Harrison v. Harrison, 321 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.) (explaining that after “evidence contradicting the presumption [of gift] has been offered, the
presumption disappears and is not weighed or treated as evidence”) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz,
873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex. 1993))).
177. Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op) (regarding wife’s testimony and other corroborating evidence as
sufficient to rebut gift presumption by clearly establishing that wife did not intend to make a gift).
178. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
179. Id.
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C. The Question Now Begged: What Is Parol Evidence?
As is obvious, parol evidence, as barred in Raymond, is very much the focus
of this article. The proper admission of parol evidence in relation to
interspousal conveyances must be understood to realize the error of the
Raymond court. The rules of evidence do not encompass what is known as
the parol evidence rule. As explained in Jarvis v. K&E Re One, L.L.C.:180
“The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of substantive
contract law.”181 The fact that the bar to parol evidence should arise out
of contract law makes sense because the viability of contract law hinges
upon the dependability of a written agreement (i.e., the parties to a written
agreement should be able to depend upon their negotiated, written, and
executed document as representing the entirety of their agreement). Indeed,
that is what the court seemed to focus on in deciding Raymond, that the
document in question was not ambiguous, stating:
Frank never presented evidence at trial of fraud, accident, or mistake [in entering
the agreement]; nor did he establish any ambiguity in his deed to Brenda. Absent
such evidence, the trial court erred in considering parol evidence of intent.
The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter of law, it effectively
transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property to
Brenda.182

The Raymond court takes a rather myopic view of parol evidence by their
limitation of what is deemed the proper circumstance allowing for the use
of parol evidence. The Raymond court seemingly restricts the use of parol
evidence to ambiguous agreements183 or when the subject agreement,
itself, is entered into by fraud, accident or mistake.184 While it could be
argued that the Raymond conveyance really is ambiguous, as inferred but not

180. Jarvis v. K & E Re One, L.L.C., 390 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
181. Id. at 638 (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. 1958); Edascio,
L.L.C. v. NextiraOne L.L.C., 264 S.W.3d 786, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)).
182. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Dalton v. Pruett,
483 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ)).
183. See id. (comparing the Raymond case to Massey, where the court “held that parol evidence is
not admissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous document” (citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d
391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))).
184. See id. (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic
evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud,
accident, or mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); Massey,
807 S.W.2d at 405)).
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held by the Raymond court itself,185 it is nevertheless the law that an
interspousal agreement or transfer need not be ambiguous to trigger the
allowance of parol evidence.186 The Raymond court’s strict and limiting use
of parol evidence ignores those general civil cases, as well as the interspousal
transfer cases, that have approved the admission of parol evidence to
“‘clarify, explain, or give meaning to terms of a contract that are facially
incomplete.’ Therefore, to the extent parol evidence demonstrates a prior or
contemporaneous agreement collateral to and consistent with—that does
not vary or contradict—the contract, [parol evidence] can be
considered.”187
For example, in Ward v. Marino,188 a case not involving an interspousal
conveyance, a home owner and a plumber entered into a contract for
plumbing services. However, the contract did not encompass matters such
as a description of the entirety of the work to be performed, the charge for
the work, or whether the charge would be limited to what could be
collected from the insurance company.189 Recognizing that it is almost
universally accepted that the parol evidence rule bars testimony or other
extrinsic evidence that would have the effect of altering, expanding, or
contradicting an unambiguous document,190 the Ward court held that the
use of parol evidence was properly admitted because “where a writing is
incomplete or ambiguous, parol evidence becomes admissible to explain the
writing or to assist in the ascertainment of the true intention of the parties

185. Arguably, the first footnote in Raymond supports the rejected possibility that the Raymond
conveyance document was ambiguous. See id. at 80–81 n.1 (“Our holding on appellant’s points of
error, however, is the same regardless of whether the conveyance was a sale or gift. Therefore, we will
assume, without holding, that the conveyance was a gift.”).
186. See Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“[W]e
find that the parol evidence rule does not prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumptions
of community property and gift.”).
187. Tex–Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne, 492 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
no pet.) (citation omitted) (first quoting Boondoggles Corp. v. Yancey, No. 01–05–00185–CV,
2006 WL 2192708, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2006, no pet.); then citing David J.
Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Hua Xu v. Lam, No. 14–13–
00730–CV, 2014 WL 5795475, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.)).
188. Ward v. Marino, No. 13–00–00784–CV, 2002 WL 253789 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
Feb. 21, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
189. Id. at *1.
190. See David J. Sacks, P.C., 266 S.W.3d at 450 (deeming an attorney’s fee contract unambiguous
and parol evidence rightly barred even though a total cost, or a cap on cost, for services to be rendered
was not included in the contract); Lewis v. E. Tex. Fin. Co., 146 S.W.2d 977, 979–80 (Tex. 1941)
(finding a lease for land was unambiguous and thus that the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence).
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insofar as the parol evidence does not alter or contradict any part of the
written memorandum in question.”191
Not only did the Raymond court ignore the more lenient, general civil cases,
the opinion also failed to recognize that interspousal conveyances also
trigger a more lenient approach to parol evidence. Accordingly, another
shortcoming of the Raymond court is the failure to recognize that, parol
evidence is allowed to explain interspousal transfers because such is
consistent with the law of resulting trusts previously discussed192 and
can be used to explain a conveyance.
An example of parol evidence being allowed in an interspousal
conveyance that was addressed in light of resulting trust law is the case
of Bahr v. Kohr.193 Specifically, the Kohrs claimed and the trial court found
that property conveyed to husband and wife during their marriage was the
separate property of the wife having been purchased with wife’s separate
funds.194 The San Antonio Court of Appeals noted that when such a
purchase by or through a spouse’s separate funds or property occurs, and
title is taken in the name of both spouses, a gift to the non- paying spouse
will be presumed.195 In essence, the community property presumption is
replaced by the presumption that the paying spouse intended to make a gift
to the other spouse.196 As the San Antonio court noted in the Bahr v. Kohr
case: “This rule is consistent with the principles of trust law concerning
purchase money resulting trusts.”197 Citing Cockerham,198 the San Antonio
court opined that parol evidence can be and was properly utilized to rebut
the presumption of gift and to establish separate property, because parol

191. Ward, 2002 WL 253789, at *1–2 (emphasis added) (citing First Victoria Nat’l Bank v.
Briones, 788 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Patterson v. Patterson,
679 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ); Warren Bros. Co. v. A.A.A. Pipe
Cleaning Co., 601 S.W.2d 436, 438–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
192. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 440–443 (AM. LAW INST. 1935) (implying the
use of parol evidence as a potential means of preventing a resulting trust from forming).
193. Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
194. Id. at 726.
195. See id. (highlighting the gift presumption that arises when a spouse uses separate property
to acquire property that is treated as a part of the community during marriage).
196. See id. (“[A] presumption arises that the purchasing spouse intended to make a gift of onehalf of the separate funds to the other spouse.” (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168
(Tex. 1975); In re Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, writ denied))).
197. Id. (citing In re Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d at 273).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 164–71 for discussion of the Cockerham case.
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evidence would “clarify, explain, or give meaning to terms of a contract that
are facially incomplete[.]”199
On appeal, the Bahrs argued that parol evidence should be proscribed,
and the Kohr wife should not be able to use parol evidence to establish the
questioned property as her separate, citing Massey v. Massey.200 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals recognized that, generally, “When a writing is
intended as a completed memorial of a legal transaction, the parol evidence
rule excludes other evidence of any prior or contemporaneous expressions
of the parties relating to that transaction.”201 However, the Bahr v. Kohr
court analyzed Massey; and as explained earlier, the Massey conveyancing
document contained express/significant recitals with an accompanying
promissory note establishing the acquisition as a purchase during the
marriage and not a gift to Massey husband from his family.202 Accordingly,
the Massey court was correct in determining that parol evidence could not
be used to vary a writing establishing purchase by the community unless
there had been fraud or accident or mistake in entering into the
transaction.203
Likewise, the San Antonio court distinguished the Bahr matter from Henry

199. See Tex–Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne, 492 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, no pet.) (“[T]o the extent parol evidence demonstrates a prior or contemporaneous agreement
collateral to and consistent with . . . the contract, it can be considered.” (citing David J. Sacks, P.C. v.
Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Hua Xu v. Lam, No. 14–13–00730–CV,
2014 WL 5795475, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.))); Bahr, 980 S.W.2d
at 726–27 (“[T]he [gift] presumption can be rebutted by evidence of the absence of an intent to make
a gift.” (citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168)).
200. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726 (“The Bahrs argue that in cases where the community property
is land evidenced by an unambiguous deed, parol evidence will not be admitted to rebut the
presumption of community property.” (citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))); see also supra text accompanying notes 84–94 for discussion of
the Massey case.
201. Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726 (citing Muhm v. Davis, 580 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e)).
202. See id. (noting the Massey court did not allow parol evidence when the documents were
unambiguous); Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (recognizing the deeds of trust and promissory notes
contained language sufficient to prevent admission of parol evidence).
203. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 725 (“[A] spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not
introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed without first
tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Massey,
807 S.W.2d at 405))); Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 405 (stating the same: “A spouse who is a party to a deed
transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the deed
without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans,
452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970))).
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S. Miller, Co. v. Evans204 because the pertinent Miller instruments of
conveyance established that the properties were explicitly conveyed to the
wife as her separate property.205 The San Antonio court, recognizing that
there was no significant recital, ultimately held: “The parol evidence rule
does not prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumptions of
community property and gift.”206 A like outcome should have occurred in
Raymond.
While the San Antonio court’s opinion in Bahr v. Kohr is one of the more
recent opinions to approach this issue of parol evidence from a scholarly
resulting-trust perspective, it is only one of many opinions to reach this
result. For example in Carter v. Carter,207 husband testified, in keeping with
Peterson v. Peterson,208 that the inclusion of his wife’s name on the deed of the
subject property was the doing of the title company and not done at his
behest.209 Husband’s testimony so explaining was deemed properly
admitted and rebutted the gift presumption.210
Further, in Galvan v. Galvan,211 wife urged that the trial court erred in
allowing parol evidence to vary the effect of a deed as a presumed gift
from husband’s parents to their son/her husband and to her as his
wife.212 The parol evidence was admitted “to rebut prima facie
presumptions of a gift to appellant [wife] of an [undivided] one-half
interest . . . . From the evidence the court concluded that the tract was the
separate property of appellee [husband].”213 The Galvan court recognized
that parol evidence could be utilized to establish the true intent of the parties

204. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31 for discussion of the Henry S. Miller case.
205. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 727 (“In the Miller case, a deed recited that the conveyed property
was the separate property of the wife.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co., 452 S.W.2d at 429)).
206. Id.
207. Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
208. Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1980, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
209. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 781. The Peterson document did not include any statement as to the
character of property or the identity of the funds with which it was acquired or for what purpose it was
acquired or that it was a gift; to those the document was silent. See Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 890–91
(holding the property at issue was separate property by tracing the entire purchase back to the separate
funds of the husband).
210. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d at 892.
211. Galvan v. Galvan, 534 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.—Austin 1976, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
212. See id. at 399–400 (stating appellant appealed, claiming an undivided one-half interest in a
tract of land).
213. Id. at 400.
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to vary presumptions arising from non-specific recitals.214 As the Galvan
court explained, while husband’s intention to gift to wife or the intent of a
grantor to include wife in a gift may be established by parol evidence, the
ultimate determination as to whether the gift presumption has been
overcome rests with the finder of fact, be it judge or jury.215
A more recent holding, also recognizing the propriety of parol
evidence, is the aforementioned case of Stearns v. Martens.216 The Stearns
case involved a company, Stearns Pools and Spas, that husband had founded
prior to marriage.217 After a few years of marriage, the Stearns business was
incorporated and of the one million shares issued, forty-nine percent of
the shares were placed in husband’s name and fifty-one percent were placed
in the name of the wife.218 There were no significant recitals identifying
whether these shares were separate property of the respective spouses, or
separately acquired, or gifted, or whether the shares were community;
accordingly, the community property presumption would be applied.219
That is, the shares placed in the names of the respective spouses were
presumed community upon issuance.
Not only did the Stearns husband work in the pool business, he was also
active in the reserve military which included a deployment to Iraq and later,
in 2008, a deployment to Afghanistan.220 Prior to his deployment,
husband and wife signed a stock transfer agreement and husband thereby

214. See id. (“Recitals of a deed are not conclusive as to consideration, and inquiry by parol
evidence may be employed to show the real consideration, if there was any.” (citing Puckett v. Frizzell,
377 S.W.2d 715, 721 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1964, no writ); Kleck v. Kleck, 246 S.W. 720, 723–24 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1922, no writ))).
215. Id.
216. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)
(“[W]e agree with the body of cases in which courts of appeals hold that, if the instrument contains no
separate-property recitals, then parol evidence is admissible regarding the marital-property issue.” (first
citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet.
denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet.))).
217. Id. at 545.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 547–48 (implying no recital took place because husband’s pool company was
formed into a corporation and stocks were issued).
220. See id. at 545(stating husband served in the Army Reserve and was deployed to both Iraq
and Afghanistan).
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transferred the 490,000 shares in his name to wife.221 As explained by the
appellate court:
The Agreement provides, among other things, that “[Jim]222 hereby sells
all of [Jim’s] Stock of [Stearns Pools] to [Lisa]223 and [Lisa] hereby purchases
such Stock from [Jim] in exchange for the payment of Ten and no/100
Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged.” The Agreement does not
contain any statement that any part of its consideration was Jim’s separate
property, nor does the Agreement contain the terms “gift,” “partition,”
“separate property,” “separate use,” or “separate estate.” After the transaction,
Stearns Pools’s corporate records reflected that Lisa owned all of the
outstanding shares of common stock.224

Within days after husband returned from Afghanistan,225 wife filed for
divorce and claimed that all of the pool company stock was her separate
property and while husband disputed this claim, the trial court rendered a
directed verdict in favor of wife that the forty-nine percent of stock that
husband transferred to wife was wife’s separate property.226 This
characterization, among a myriad of other trial court determinations, was
appealed by husband.227 Interestingly enough,228 wife did not urge just
one theory to support her separate property claim, but as the appellate
court explained, she asserted at least three, thus:
Lisa asserted that she had proved as a matter of law that the 490,000 shares in
Stearns Pools were her separate property under three theories:
(1) By means of the Agreement, Jim made a gift of these shares to Lisa;

221. Id.
222. James, referred to as Jim in the opinion, is the husband in Stearns. Id.
223. Lisa Martens is the wife in Stearns. Id.
224. Id. at 545. On appeal, Jim urged that the trial court erred in granting Lisa’s request for a
directed verdict establishing that the 490,000 shares were Lisa’s separate property as a matter of law,
thereby foreclosing Jim’s right to present evidence of his lack of donative intent; the appellate court
held that the trial court erred, sustaining Jim’s argument. Id. at 546–47.
225. Within two days of his returning home, Lisa filed for divorce. Id. at 545.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 546.
228. Perhaps if Lisa had remained true to one theory of separate characterization, her claim
would have appeared more plausible.
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(2) The Agreement is a valid and enforceable partition or exchange
agreement under Family Code section 4.102; and
(3) The Agreement is a valid means of making the shares the
separate property of Lisa by a sale of the shares from Jim to Lisa.
Lisa also argued that under the Agreement all one million shares of Stearns
Pools were made her separate property.229

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston was very clear in its holding
that Lisa did not, as a matter of law, prove her separate property claim,
disapproved of the Raymond opinion, and determined that husband had
the right to have his parol evidence heard as to his intention in
transferring the forty-nine percent of the Stearns Pools and Spas stock before
he deployed.230 The Stearns court’s holding is worthy of quotation:
[W]e agree with the body of cases in which courts of appeals hold that, if
the instrument contains no separate-property recitals, then parol evidence is
admissible regarding the marital-property issue. Because the Agreement
contains no separate-property recitals, parol evidence is admissible regarding
the marital-property issue, and there is no irrebuttable presumption that the
transferred shares are Lisa’s separate property.231

The Stearns conveyance was incomplete in terms of characterizing the
property or in providing any facts which would summarily establish the
character of the stock. Likewise incomplete was the Raymond agreement,
which—as described by the Houston court—was a separate deed executed
by husband after marriage, conveying to wife “an undivided one-half interest
in the Lake Jackson property. Frank [husband] was the only grantor, and
Brenda [wife] was the only grantee.”232 The court further describes the

229. Id. at 545. While the trial court directed a verdict that forty-nine percent of the stock—
490,000 shares originally issued in Jim’s name and later conveyed by Jim—were Lisa’s separate
property, the character of the remaining fifty-one percent—510,000 shares initially placed in Lisa’s
name—was presented as a jury question. Id. The jury found that the initial 510,000 shares placed in
Lisa’s name were community property. Id.
230. Id. at 548.
231. Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL
3799668, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d
723, 726–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); then citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d
910, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
232. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81.
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conveyance, thus: “The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter
of law, it effectively transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake
Jackson property to Brenda.”233 An undivided one-half interest does not
establish separate character. The Raymond conveyance provided no more
language of intent than did the conveyancing documents in Stearns which
the Stearns court described as having “no separate-property recitals”234
thereby incapable of creating an irrebuttable presumption of separate
property235 and holding “parol evidence is admissible regarding the maritalproperty issue.”236
As made clear by the Stearns court, the significant or express recital is the
deciding factor as to whether parol evidence can be presented to rebut the
presumption of a gift.237 The Raymond court simply glossed over this
requisite by the statement, “A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may
not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to contradict the express recitals in the
deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.”238 The
Raymond court never avails the reader of the language that was considered by
the court to be the express recital leaving the reader to speculate that perhaps
the mere conveyance of “an undivided one-half interest”239 could perhaps
be considered significant.
V. IS A SIGNIFICANT RECITAL ESTABLISHING AN IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF GIFT SO EASILY RECOGNIZED?
The seminal case on the use of parol evidence in the face of a significant
recital is the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Messer v. Johnson.240 The
Messer court, writing through Justice Walker, introduces their holding
regarding the use of parol evidence in an interspousal transfer that
employed a significant recital, thus:

233. Id.
234. Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 548.
235. Id. at 548.
236. Id. at 548 (first citing Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6–7; Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 726–27; then
citing Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912–13; Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 80–81).
237. Stearns, 476 S.W.3d at 547–48.
238. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81 (emphasis added) (first citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans,
452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex. 1970); then citing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
239. See id. (“The deed was unambiguous on its face, and, as a matter of law, it effectively
transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Lake Jackson property to Brenda.”).
240. Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1968).
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Real estate was conveyed to a married woman. Her husband joined in the
deed as one of the grantors, and the instrument declared that the land was
conveyed to the grantee as her separate estate and to her sole and separate use.241 The
question to be decided is whether parol evidence may be received to show a
resulting trust in favor of the community estate. We reaffirm the rule that it
may not.242

Messer v. Johnson, as noted in this article, addresses the underpinnings of
proper characterization of marital property subject to interspousal transfers
by explaining the principles of resulting trusts.243 What is of import is that
the opinion in Messer v. Johnson was a reiteration of long existing and
accepted Texas law.
For example, the Messer v. Johnson opinion cites the 1900 Texas Supreme
Court case of Kahn v. Kahn,244 recognizing that when there is a significant
recital establishing that wife paid for the property “out of her separate funds
and for her separate use and benefit,”245 that:
without proof of fraud or mistake in the insertion of the recitals in the deed,
parol evidence was not admissible to show that the maker of it did not intend to
convey the property to his wife as her separate property, and this for the reason
that the deed on its face clearly expressed such intent.246

This basis for characterizing, in conformance with a separate property
recital and such recital’s appurtenant bar to parol evidence, is what
the Raymond court ignored, even though the Raymond court offhandedly
mentioned “express recitals.”247 Messer v. Johnson also references like
holdings by the Texas Supreme Court, such as McKivett v. McKivett 248

241. This is the essence of the Messer v. Johnson significant recital. Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
242. Id.
243. See id. at 910–11 (emphasis added) (explaining the results of interspousal transfers by
analyzing the characterization of marital property in Kahn v. Kahn).
244. Kahn v. Kahn, 58 S.W. 825 (Tex. 1900).
245. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kahn, 58 S.W. at 825).
246. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kahn, 58 S.W. at 825).
247. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
248. McKivett v. McKivett, 70 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1934). See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (citing
McKivett, 70 S.W.2d at 695–96) (reciting the McKivett holding that “[p]arol evidence should not be
admitted to prove that [a deed] was conveyed for a different purpose or use” because parol evidence
is inadmissible to establish a trust contrary to the plain intention of the grantor expressed in the deed
(quoting McKivett, 70 S.W.2d at 696)).
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and Lindsay v. Clayman.249
Because Messer v. Johnson is the seminal case in this area of marital
property characterization, and even though it is a reiteration of the law, the
facts that give rise to a case that caused the Texas Supreme Court to revisit
a settled question are important. During the Johnson marriage, certain real
property was conveyed to wife (Pearl) by a third party; however, husband, who
had no ownership interest in the property, chose to join in the conveyance
as a grantor.250 This joinder placed husband in privity with the contract
establishing that he had express knowledge of and approved the
conveyance.251 The property was conveyed to wife as “her sole and separate
estate, and to her sole and separate use.”252 The Texas Supreme Court noted
that “[t]his recital appears in the granting clause, the habendum clause and
the warranty clause, but the deed does not state that the consideration was
paid by the grantee out of her separate property.”253
In Messer v. Johnson, wife dies and surviving husband sought to establish
that the property so conveyed to his wife was community property.254 At
trial, husband was allowed (ultimately deemed in error) to testify that the
purchase price of more than $12,000 was paid from his and his deceased
wife’s community funds.255 He further testified that the property was
placed in wife’s name so that his adult son from a prior marriage would not
assert an interest in the property should he have died before his wife.256
Clearly, the Johnson husband was trying to shield his wife from confrontation
with his son from a previous marriage should wife survive him. However,
best-laid plans can go awry and here, contrary to the obvious plan, wife died

249. Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1952). See Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 911 (citing
Lindsay, 254 S.W.2d 777) (reciting the Lindsay holding that use of parol evidence is impermissible to
establish a resulting trust that favors the community where a third party conveys property to wife as
her separate property in a transaction that husband partakes in to a degree sufficient to consider him a
party to the conveyance instrument).
250. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 909–10.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 910 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
253. Id.
254. By wife’s will, husband was devised the entirety of her community estate but was only
given a life estate in her separate property. Id. Wife’s niece, Myrtle Messer, was devised the remainder
interest. Id. Husband was given the right to sell the separate property if necessary to maintain a
comfortable existence, but he had gifted it to his current wife and wanted to establish that he was free
to do so, claiming that the subject property was the community of him and his deceased wife. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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first.257 The jury, having been allowed to hear the parol evidence of
husband, was convinced by husband’s story and found that the property was
the community of husband and deceased wife.258
The niece, Myrtle Messer, who under certain circumstances was to
inherit her aunt’s separate property, properly objected to husband’s
testimony because it violated the parol evidence rule; thereafter, the niece
appealed.259 The niece urged on appeal that the parol evidence was admitted
in error and that the subject property should be recognized as the separate
property of the deceased wife, based on significant recitals in the
conveyancing documents.260 The Texas Supreme Court agreed with niece
and held that the only time that parol evidence could be used to explain
or contradict a significant recital would be when equitable allegations of
“fraud, duress or mistake”261 regarding the inclusion of the significant
recital are made.262 No such equitable arguments were made by husband
in Messer v. Johnson.263
The case of Messer v. Johnson also mentions, by way of comparison, the case
of Jackson v. Hernandez,264 wherein parol evidence was allowed. In Jackson
v. Hernandez, the deed did not include a significant recital and the parol
evidence did not alter the deed, but merely explained that while the property
was held in the name of her mother, the daughter who paid the purchase price
for property should have the reversionary interest (a trust results to her
benefit) after the mother died.265 In light of these cases one wonders, what
words should have been present for the Raymond court to properly bar parol
evidence?
VI. WHAT WORDS ARE RECOGNIZED AS SIGNIFICANT RECITALS?
The aforementioned opinion of Reaves v. Reaves, provided explanation of
what is meant by these words of art, “significant recital.”266 Significant
recitals are also known as express recitals, and such was the term used by the
257. Id.
258. See id. (finding the conveyance to husband and wife to be community property).
259. Id. at 908.
260. Id. at 912.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See generally id. at 908 (mentioning no equitable arguments asserted by the husband).
264. Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1955).
265. Id. at 189.
266. Reaves v. Reaves, No. 11–11–00026–CV, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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Raymond Court267 as well as mentioned in Reaves.268 While an unpublished,
memorandum opinion, the Reaves Court explains that significant/express
recitals usually have language establishing a spouse paid for the subject
property with separate funds or said property was simply conveyed as the
separate property of the named owning spouse.269 More particularly, the
court noted that significant/express recitals “involve the use of specific
terminology. . . . ‘[involving] deeds which expressly state that property is
conveyed to grantees as their separate property or for their separate use.’”270 To
further clarify, the Reaves court opined “[t]he decision to exclude parol
evidence rests ‘not upon a recital of contractual consideration, but upon the
fact that the instrument stipulated, in effect, that the beneficial ownership
of the property was conveyed to the [spouse] for [his or her] separate
use.’”271
In Reaves, husband’s urging of the irrebuttable gift presumption and his
use of the parol evidence rule as a bar to wife’s explanation, is very
unusual. In Reaves, the wife, Karen, had purchased an annuity with the
proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the death of her
first husband who was in the military and who died.272 Karen owned this
annuity prior to her marriage to her current husband, John, whom she was
now divorcing.273 During her marriage to John, Karen suffered
debilitating physical pain and was on a regiment of high intensity pain
relievers, including Vicodin.274
While Karen was undergoing this treatment, John introduced Karen to a
financial planner who attended the same church as the couple.275 A new
financial plan was concocted for the couple and Karen’s annuity, that she
267. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet) (“A spouse who is a party to a deed transaction may not introduce parol or extrinsic evidence to
contradict the express recitals in the deed without first tendering evidence of fraud, accident, or
mistake.” (citing Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 431–32 (Tex.1970); Massey v. Massey,
807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied))).
268. See Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668, at *6 (holding parol evidence is not allowed to contradict any
express recitals in a deed).
269. Id.
270. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1998, no pet).
271. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1955)).
272. Id. at *1.
273. Id.
274. See id. at *2 (describing the medications Karen’s doctors prescribed her for pain
management).
275. Id.
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owned before marriage, was converted to a different annuity that
encompassed a change of owner that had the effect of naming John as a coowner and stripped Karen of her sole right to make changes to the annuity
in the future.276
Upon divorce, John argued that parol evidence should not be allowed
to rebut the gift presumption that arose by virtue of Karen naming John as
a co-owner of what had been her separate property.277 John argued that
there was a significant recital that barred the use of parol evidence and that
Karen should not be allowed to testify to the circumstances surrounding
the change of ownership, specifically:278
John points to part of the letter of acknowledgment of the Future Annuity
II that Karen signed that contains a statement that she “ordered the liquidation
and transfer [of an] investment [she] currently own[s].” This, he says, is a
“separate property recital” because it states that the consideration for the
Future Annuity II was Karen’s separate property. He also cites the prospectus
for the Future Annuity II because it states that “[j]oint owners each own an
undivided interest in the contract.”279

Thereafter the Eastland Court of Appeals provides a most eloquent
explanation of language that can properly be considered a significant recital.
Rather than paraphrasing, the Eastland Court’s analysis is worthy of
quotation, thus:
The recitals to which John refers in this case do not state that John purchased
his interest in the annuity with his own separate property. Also, the recitals
are not that the property will be John’s “separate” or “sole and separate”
property or for his “separate use.” The words “separate property” or “separate
use” are never used in the contract, letter of acknowledgment, or prospectus.
Though the contract uses the term “joint owner,” which is defined in the
prospectus as giving joint owners “an undivided interest in the contract,”
nothing in the documents indicates that there has been a conveyance from
Karen to John or that any sort of transfer in beneficial ownership has
occurred. The trial court found that Karen relied upon Dwinell’s280 advice
in the transaction, but when asked about the meaning of “undivided interest,”

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *6.
See id. (pointing to a “separate property recital” in the instrument of conveyance).
Id. (alterations in original).
Dwinell is the financial planner to whom Karen was introduced by John. Id. at *1.
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Dwinell testified, “You’re going way back in my memory banks” and “That’s a
legal term and I’m sorry.” Because the contract does not expressly recite the
character and use of the property, we find that the parol evidence rule does not
prevent introduction of evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift.281

The Eastland court’s analysis, taken in conjunction with Karen’s
testimony that she never intended to make a gift, rebutted the gift
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. If one looks to the language,
or lack thereof as to gift, sole or separate use, or purchase by sole or separate
funds in the Raymond case, it is clear there was no significant recital.282
Raymond, based upon all case law, is wrong.
VII. WHAT HELL HATH RAYMOND WROUGHT—
THE FAR REACHING EFFECT OF A RENEGADE OPINION
It is clear from the foregoing that the rules governing the use of parol
evidence in light of significant recitals are very well established, as are the
rules establishing what language is necessary for a recital to be considered
significant. If one applies the rules as explained, surely the use of parol
evidence should be allowed if a Raymond situation arises. One might
easily disregard Raymond as an anomaly. Such complacency, however,
should not be the approach taken to this problem because there are some
courts and some appellate lawyers that love Raymond.
In the years since the Raymond opinion, nearly fifteen appellate opinions283
have acknowledged Raymond, and some of these opinions appear to be
281. Id. at *6.
282. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
283. The following cases cite Raymond with regard to holdings that address the gift
presumption and the use of evidence to rebut same, as follows: Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W. 3d 541,
548 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 709
(Tex. App.⎯Texarkana 2013, no pet.); In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tex.
App.⎯Amarillo 2011, no pet.); Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas
2007, pet. denied). The Magness case, is the most oft cited of the Raymond progeny, and the cases that
cite it while addressing the gift presumption and the use of evidence to rebut same, as follows: Cardenas
v. Cardenas, No. 13–16–00064–CV, 2017 WL 1089683, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Corpus Christi Mar. 23,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Pearson v. Pearson, No. 03–13–00802–CV, 2016 WL 240683, at *5 (Tex.
App.⎯Austin Jan. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In the Interest of C.E.W., No. 05–14–00459–CV,
2015 WL 5099336, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Gonzalez-Limon
v. Gonzalez, No. 04–14–00011–CV, 2014 WL 6475800, at *1 (Tex. App.⎯San Antonio Nov. 19,
2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Clay v. Clay, No. 05–13–00624–CV, 2014 WL 2993812, at *2 (Tex.
App.⎯Dallas June 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mora v. Mora, No. 04–12–00638–CV, 2014 WL
769441, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Motley v. Motley,
390 S.W.3d 689, 693–94 (Tex. App.⎯Dallas 2012, no pet.); Zoller v. Zoller, No. 01–09– 00992–CV,
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expressions of “love” citing Raymond or its progeny to disallow parol
evidence, even when there was no significant/express recital, when
considering the character of marital property conveyed between spouses.
Even more “loving” than these few courts, would be numerous appellate
lawyers who cite Raymond in hopes maintaining a gift made to the spouse
they represent or, on occasion, who are seeking to have an appellate court
render that their spouse did indeed receive a gift via an irrebuttable
presumption. Further, one cannot begin to determine the number of trial
court cases where the Raymond analysis is proffered and accepted to the
detriment of a spouse unable to afford an appeal. For this reason, the cases
citing both Raymond and its most visible progeny beg review.
The most current case to cite Raymond regarding the gift presumption and
rebuttal by the use of parol evidence is the case that spawned this article,
Stearns v. Martens. The Stearns case has been discussed throughout the article
and therefore need not be reiterated at this stage, but to say that the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals did the right thing. However, other cases that
have cited Raymond, will be included in this summative survey.
Magness v. Magness,284 is the most oft cited of the Raymond progeny in
opinions addressing the interspousal gift presumption and the use of parol
evidence to rebut same. In Magness, there was an interspousal transfer that
occurred pursuant to the refinance of a home.285 The deed evidences that
wife as grantor transferred a one-half interest in what had been her
separate property home to husband, as grantee.286 The actual language of
the deed is not provided and the parol evidence rule is not mentioned in the
Magness opinion. While the trial allowed the wife to testify that she had no
intention to make a gift of the home to the husband and only signed the
deed as a condition of refinancing home, the trial court nonetheless
determined that because wife did not establish that the deed was procured by
fraud, accident, or mistake, evidence of her intent could not be considered.287
The trial court found that wife had gifted half of her separate property home
2011 WL 1587358, at *2 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rosensky
v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164, at *4 (Tex. App.⎯Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3,
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ussery v. Ussery, No. 03–10–00183–CV, 2010 WL 4910049, at *2 (Tex.
App.⎯Austin Dec. 2, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
284. Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
285. See id. at 913 (explaining wife thought the deed was a necessary part of refinancing and did
not intend to give husband a gift of interest in the home).
286. Id.
287. See id. (“The trial court was free to disbelieve any of all of [wife]’s testimony.” (citing
Cardwell v. Cardwell, 195 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.))).
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to husband so that it was half wife’s separate property and half husband’s
separate property; this was affirmed on appeal.288
The Magness case has been often used to deny a spouse the right to present
evidence of intent. However, in the Moncey case, the outcome was somewhat
different. In re Marriage of Moncey289 included a deed that provided:
That Pamela Harris Parrish and Becky Lynn Hutto, owning their interest
in the property below as their sole and separate property and owning other
property as their homestead, for and in consideration of the exchange of the
property described herein, has granted, transferred and conveyed and by these
presents does grant, transfer and convey unto Tammie Harris Moncey and
her Husband John Moncey . . . all of Grantor’s interest in the following
described real property . . . .290

The foregoing was a deed conveying twenty-three-acres and a home from a
trust corpus to husband and wife.291 John Moncey, husband, argued on
appeal that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to determine
the grantor’s intent, urging that the parol evidence rule barred the evidence.292
Specifically, the trial court considered affidavits of wife’s sisters and of the
husband, each of which addressed the intent of wife’s sisters, the grantor’s
in this case.293 Husband tried to invoke the Raymond/Magness rule to
exclude parol evidence in a third party transaction where both spouses were
named in the deed conveyancing the disputed property.294 The appellate
court recognizes the Raymond/Magness rule for interspousal transactions,
but in apparent keeping with the dicta of Raymond, determines that the
parol evidence rule does not apply to third party transactions wherein parol
evidence can be admitted.295 The property was held to be the separate
property of the wife, sister of the grantors, and in keeping with the affidavits,
parol evidence, of the sisters.296
288. Id.
289. In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
290. Id. at 707.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 709.
293. See id. at 708–09 (stating affidavits from wife’s sisters contended it was never their intention
for husband to have any ownership of the property).
294. See id. at 709 (“[Husband] asserts that since he is a named grantee in the deed without
ambiguity, no further evidence of intent may be received.” (citing CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec.,
L.L.P. v. Old TJC Co., 177 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied))).
295. Id. at 710–11.
296. See id. at 714 (concluding wife established the property was her separate property).
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In re Marriage of Skarda,297 is a refinancing case, where husband refinanced
his separate property.298 As part of the refinancing, husband and wife signed
a warranty deed conveying the property to husband and wife as “joint tenants
with right of survivorship.”299 A deed of trust identified husband and wife,
jointly, as borrower.300 Husband testified that it was not his intent to gift
half of the property to wife.301 Wife on the on the other hand, was not so
clear, asserting she owned half of the property by gift or otherwise and
even asserting that her interest was community.302 While the evidence of
intent was allowed, the court determined that the gift presumption was not
rebutted because husband failed to offer evidence of equitable defenses, i.e.,
fraud, accident, mistake, or undue influence.303
Leaving the cases that cite Raymond, but instead depend solely on the
like holding of Magness, the survey begins with Cardenas v. Cardenas.304 In
Cardenas, husband obtained a $30,000 loan and had his wife use those funds
to purchase a piece of property from a neighbor.305 The property was
deeded to wife as her “sole and separate property,” a classic significant
recital.306 The parol evidence rule was not specifically mentioned in the
opinion, and both husband and wife testified regarding the circumstances
of the transaction and husband testified as to his intent.307 The court
never mentions that parol evidence cannot be used when a significant recital
is in play, stating only that husband’s “testimony is insufficient to disturb this
[gift] presumption.”308 In light of the significant recital in this case, your
author has no quarrel with a strict application of the parol evidence rule,
even though not mentioned by the court as it should have been.

297. In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
298. Id. at 668.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id. at 672 (alleging his only intent was to refinance the property).
302. Id.
303. See id. (holding the joint tenancy created in wife through the deed was her separate property
in the absence of evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake).
304. Cardenas v. Cardenas, No. 13–16–00064–CV, 2017 WL 1089683 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
305. Id. at *2.
306. Id.
307. See generally id. (admitting, although not explicitly, parol evidence at trial).
308. Id.
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Pearson v. Pearson309 is a rather complicated310 stock transfer case in which
parol evidence of intent was allowed. While there is not heavy reliance on
the Magness case, it is mentioned.311 Here the testimony of wife and her
mother, the transferors, established that there was no intent to make a gift
of the business to the husband.312 There was also evidence that husband
“agreed to pay Mrs. Pearson for her three shares of stock in the event of
divorce, casting doubt on its character as a gift[,]”313 although gift tax
returns were filed and explained away as having been done at husband’s
direction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination that
no gift had been made to husband based on the parol evidence rightly
allowed.314
In re C.E.W.,315 is a case which properly applies the exception to the bar on
parol evidence when a significant recital exists.316 Here, husband as grantor
conveyed his entire interest to wife, stating, “ [g]rantor grants and conveys
the property to Grantee as her sole and separate property.”317 Husband
asserted that the deed was obtained under duress and the trial court viewed
the claim of duress, an equitable assertion, in keeping with accident,
mistake or fraud.318 Parol evidence was allowed as to the duress suffered
by husband and the gift presumption was overcome and the property was
determined to be community.319
309. Pearson v. Pearson, No. 03–13–00802–CV, 2016 WL 240683 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 15,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
310. Should a transfer of stock ever be in issue, a reading of the entirety of this case is
recommended. See id. at *1 (describing a dispute between husband and wife about an interest in a
business husband acquired during the marriage and whether it was separate or community).
311. See id. at *6 (citing the Magness rule that “[a] gift is a voluntary transfer of property to
another made gratuitously and without consideration.” (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910,
912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied))).
312. Id. at *9.
313. Id.
314. See id. (“Assuming [husband] raised the presumption of gift by showing the transfer from
his wife and mother-in-law, our review of the evidence reflects that the trial court could find from
clear-and-convincing evidence that [wife] and her parents did not intend to make a separate-property
gift . . . .” ).
315. In re C.E.W., No. 05–14–00459–CV, 2015 WL 5099336 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2015,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
316. See id. at *3 (holding trial court properly treated property as community after substantive
and probative evidence showed deed was procured by duress).
317. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
318. See id. at *2 (“The parties dispute whether the trial court could have properly concluded
the deed was procured by duress, fraud, accident or mistake.”).
319. Id. at *3.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 3

856

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:809

In Gonzalez-Limon v. Gonzalez,320 husband and wife purchased property
after marriage and some three months after the purchase husband as
grantor conveyed his interest to wife.321 Parol evidence was considered
and husband explained that the property was conveyed to wife to take
advantage of her disability to gain tax exempt status as to the property.322 The
reason for conveyance did not encompass fraud, accident or mistake
and thus could not be used to rebut the gift presumption.323
Clay v. Clay,324 concerns a deed of the couple’s homestead property to
wife from husband without a significant recital. The trial court allowed both
husband and wife to testify as to the initial acquisition of the property—
funds from a settlement husband received— and about the conveyance
to wife.325 The only evidence presented to rebut the presumption that the
homestead was a gift to wife was husband’s testimony that he only intended
it as a temporary transfer to wife, though “[a]t the time, [he] did not have a
plan for when [he] would reacquire the property or how it would play
out.”326 The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision because it was
reasonable to conclude that husband failed to show fraud, accident, or
mistake.327 Thus, the trial court rightfully allowed evidence of intent, but
wrongfully evaluated the evidence in terms of a gift presumption that could
only be rebutted by an equitable defense, not a lack of donative intent.328
The Clay case, as Raymond, requires an equitable defense even when
there is not a significant recital; it is a prime example of the need for
clarification of Raymond and its ilk.

320. Gonzalez-Limon v. Gonzalez, No. 04–14–00011–CV, 2014 WL 6475800 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
321. Id. at *1.
322. Id.
323. See id. (“Because the record contains no evidence to rebut the presumption that [wife]
received the Property as separate property by gift, the trial court did not err in finding that [husband]
gifted his interest in the Property to [wife].” (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912–13 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 672 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2011, no pet.))).
324. Clay v. Clay, No. 05–13–00624–CV, 2014 WL 2993812 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 30, 2014,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
325. Id. at *2.
326. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
327. See id. at *3 (concluding trial court did not err in holding husband led to rebut the
presumption of a gift to wife).
328. See id. (holding that because a presumption of gift may be rebutted by proof of fraud,
accident, or mistake, husband’s testimony as to lack of donative intent was insufficient to rebut said
presumption).
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Mora v. Mora,329 entails a deed from husband to wife, thus: “The deed is
from Salvador as grantor to Sylvia as grantee and conveys a ‘one-half (½)
undivided community interest in and to’ the property.”330 The question
before the court was whether this conveyed half of the property to Sylvia (her
name had not appeared on the deed before) or did this convey the entirety
to her as separate property?331 The most disturbing aspect of the case is
the court’s reasoning, thus:
In this case, the testimony of Salvador and the attorney was conflicting; however,
the language of the deed from Salvador to Sylvia is unambiguous. Accordingly, the trial
judge could have chosen to disbelieve Salvador’s testimony, and the evidence is
sufficient to support the trial court’s characterization of the property as
Sylvia’s separate property.332

The language is disturbing because it seems to infer, much as did Raymond,
that the conveyance of an undivided interest is a significant recital (with
which this author takes issues), while at the same time confusing it with
testimony that would not have been considered if rules governing significant
recital were properly applied. Again, a case that supports the need for further
elucidation in this area.
In Motley v. Motley,333 the actual language of the deed, entered into as part
of a refinancing transaction, was not mentioned, but the deed granted the
husband an undivided one-half interest in property that wife asserted had
originally been her separate property.334 The wife testified that she did not
make a gift to her husband and she did not know that by virtue of the
refinance that her husband would obtain an interest in what she thought
was her property; indeed, she testified she would not have refinanced if
she had known of the resulting effect.335 Nonetheless, the appellate
court confirmed the decision of the trial court recognizing that the trial court
judged the credibility of witnesses.336 At least it appears in Motley that the
329. Mora v. Mora, No. 04–12–00638–CV, 2014 WL 769441 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
330. Id. at *7.
331. Id.
332. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
333. Motley v. Motley, 390 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
334. Id. at 691, 693.
335. Id. at 693.
336. See id. (“As fact finder . . . the trial court was free to disbelieve any or all of appellant’s
testimony and conclude that appellant failed to the rebut the gift presumption.” (citing Magness v.
Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied))).
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rules were followed in that there was no significant recital and parol evidence
was considered.
Zoller v. Zoller337 is somewhat unusual in that it involves an Oldsmobile
and a Mercury Marquis that husband claims were gifted from his father
and therefore his, husband’s,338 separate property.339 Interestingly, while
husband claims a gift, he acknowledged that he had agreed to pay for one of
the cars, but to pay less than a quarter of its fair market value.340 No other
evidence was offered as to the gift from husband’s father. The court
deemed this insufficient to establish a gift especially in light of the
testimony of purchase.341
In Rosensky v. Rosensky,342 wife claimed that her husband made a gift to her
of $72,000 that was used to purchase the homestead.343 While there was no
significant recital in the conveyancing documents, wife did rely on a letter
which she asserted husband signed two days before closing
acknowledging the gift; husband vehemently denied the authenticity of
the letter.344 Husband understood that the property was to be placed in
both of the parties names, and it was.345 In this case, an interspousal
transfer of funds, any gift presumption could be rebutted by parol evidence
in light of the fact that there was no significant recital. Essentially, the
question came down to credibility and wife’s separate property claim was
defeated by testimony of the husband.346 The appellate court denied wife’s
separate property claim.

337. Zoller v. Zoller, No. 01–09–00992–CV, 2011 WL 1587358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
338. “This is not your father’s Oldsmobile[!]” See generally Oldsmobile: Victim of Its Own Brand,
SLATE (Dec. 13, 2000, 2:31 PM), https://slate.com/business/2000/12/oldsmobile-victim-of-its-ownbrand.html [https://perma.cc/V8M4-W567] (highlighting an Oldsmobile advertising campaign).
339. Zoller, 2011 WL 1587358, at *2.
340. Id.
341. See id. (“The very fact that [husband]’s father agreed to and received consideration in exchange
for the Mercury, however, established that it was not given as a gift.” (citing Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 912)).
342. Rosensky v. Rosensky, No. 01–09–01029–CV, 2011 WL 743164 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
343. Id. at *5.
344. See id. (chronicling husband’s testimonial attempts to rebut the presumption of donative
intent).
345. Id.
346. Id. at *6.
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Ussery v. Ussery347 is another case where the actual language of the deed is
not mentioned, however it is without doubt that there was not a
significant recital. The conveyance is described by the court as follows:
Ussery contends and stated in his declaration to the trial court that the real
property was community property, but he does not dispute that he signed the
deed transferring the real property, and the deed with his signature was an
exhibit at trial. Steczkowski348 also testified that Ussery signed the deed
after he was incarcerated and that a sergeant at the prison notarized his
signature. This evidence creates a presumption that the real property was
Steczkowski’s separate property by gift and, therefore, is some evidence of a
substantive and probative character to support a finding that Ussery gave his
interest in the real property to Steczkowski.349

The appellate court considered that the reason for transferring the
property to wife was so that if husband was sued by any of his victims, the
property would not be subject to such liability; however this was not
considered by the appellate court to be evidence that wife obtained the
conveyance by “fraud, accident or mistake.”350 The fact that the court
analyzes this in terms “fraud, accident or mistake” makes cases that
encompass conveyances with significant recitals troubling. This is not a
significant recital case. Husband’s testimony should have been allowed to
rebut the presumed gift and weighed against wife’s assertions that he made
a gift to her, it should not have been constrained to a determination of
whether it met the elements of “fraud, accident or mistake.” Ussery is yet
another case that establishes the need for clarification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is indisputable that there are conflicting opinions in the intermediate
Texas appellate courts regarding the use of parol evidence to rebut the gift
presumption. Of course, this makes the question of parol evidence when
an express or significant recital is lacking, ripe for review by the Texas
Supreme Court.351
347. Ussery v. Ussery, No. 03–10–00183–CV, 2010 WL 4910049 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 2,
2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
348. Steczkowski is Ussery’s wife. Id. at *1.
349. Id. at *3 (citing Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet.
denied)).
350. Id.
351. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3.
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We can only hope that this question reaches the Texas Supreme Court so
that the court can once again explain to bench and bar resulting trust rules,
significant recitals, and parol evidence. However, until that occurs, it is
hoped that this article will shine a light on interspousal gifts, resulting trust
rules, significant recitals, and parol evidence so that such will find their
proper place in the Texas community property compendium once again. If
Raymond is overruled, or hopefully ignored, then there is no reason not to
love Raymond for what it was, an interesting diversion from longstanding
precedent.
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